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Pay for Play: Unionization and the Business of the NCAA
Welcome and Introduction
Samantha Leschek: So, good morning.  My name is 
Samantha Leschek, and I am the Executive Editor of The 
Journal of Business and Securities Law here at Michigan 
State University College of Law. It's my pleasure to 
welcome you to the Third Annual Symposium, Pay for Play
Unionization and the Business of the NCAA. Today’s 
symposium will address the most recent developments
regarding the NCAA in the movement to unionize college 
athletes and antitrust litigation involving the association. The 
movement to unionize college courts has been extremely 
significant since the Northwestern University NLRB case and 
the case of O'Bannon versus the NCAA, which sparked a 
nationwide debate on whether student athletes deserve to be 
paid based on participation in revenue generating collegiate 
sports. So, before I go any further, please help me in 
welcoming Dean Howarth, the Dean of MSU Law, who will 
be providing us with a few opening remarks. [applause].
Dean Joan Howarth: Thank you, and my opportunity this
morning is really simply to welcome everyone who's here, 
especially our panelists who are here, and the students and
our guests and to thank the students for doing such an
excellent job at identifying an important topic that we can
move forward, an important set of topics that we can move 
forward here. And I also I want to congratulate the students 
in the journal. For having somehow amassed such a, I'm 
not, I don't think A-team is a sports analogy, is it really?  It 
is really more like a Hollywood analogy, but, just to be 
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diverse I’ll say for having amassed the A-team in the talent 
and the credentials and the experience, and the work and 
the importance of the work of the guests who are here to
create this symposium. I want to also especially thank
Professors McCormick, Professor Bob McCormick and 
Professor Amy McCormick, because it is a longstanding 
credit to MSU Law that two of the leading voices on issues 
related to not just unionization and labor issues with 
amateur, I’m not sure that's the right word [laughter], 
athletics with issues related to the NCAA, the issues related
to antitrust issues, labor issues, employment issues, racial
disparity issues in high powered collegiate sports. Professor 
Amy McCormick and Professor Bob McCormick are really 
leaders in that field. And, so I know that the excitement, 
and the work of the day that will come in many ways we
can credit them for having sparked the interest and the 
importance of these issues here at MSU College of Law. 
The last thing I want to say, especially to our guests, is that 
all of us here, from me, to our professors, to our students, 
anybody here wants to help you have the most productive 
day possible. So, please let us know if you need anything at 
all and I know that the Journal has a reputation for putting 
on very, very, good events. They're very well organized and 
I expect that to continue and I know that they too want to
have you have as productive and enjoyable day as possible.
So with that, I will just say we're very glad you're here. And,
I'm looking forward to hearing all about the work of the day 
that’s going to follow.  Thank you very much. Thank you. 
[applause]. 
Samantha Leschek: Thank you again Dean Howarth for
helping us kick off our symposium. We are in very
enthusiastic to be holding such an exciting event about these
current issues in the college sports industry. We will have 
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two panels today. The first panel will be an analysis of the 
NCAA and the current movement to unionize college sports 
and the second will be the second will examine current 
antitrust issues involving the NCAA. These panels will be 
led by journal members, who will be serving as moderators. 
Panel one will run from 9:00 AM to 11:10 and then we will 
break for lunch and then the second panel will run from 
11:50 to 1:55. So, before I hand things over to the first 
panel I would like to note that the views or opinions 
expressed by the panelists today are their own and don't
necessarily reflect the opinions of Michigan State
University. So, without further ado, [laughter and banter] 
I’ll hand things over the first panel. 
Panel 1: Unionization of College Sports
Matthew Morrow: Good morning. I'm Matt Morrow, the 
incoming Editor in Chief for Volume Sixteen of the Journal
of Business and Securities Law, and I'll be serving as the
moderator for the first panel here today. This panel will be
focusing, as Sam said, on a lot of analysis of the NCAA and
the current movement to unionize college sports. Before we
get started, I would like to take a brief moment to introduce 
all the panelists and give you a little bit of background. For 
more information, they have their full biographies in the 
symposium programs that you received as you came in. Mr. 
John Adam is an attorney with Legghio & Israel, P.C. in 
Royal Oak. He represents unions and is lead attorney for the
College Athletes Players Association in the case before the
NLRB. Our own Professor Robert McCormick is an 
Emeritus Professor at the Michigan State University 
College of Law. He served as an attorney for the National
Labor Relations Board before joining the MSU College of
Law faculty here. His work is focused on the rights of the 
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NCAA college athletes, and one of his articles introduced 
the argument that college athletes of revenue generating 
sports should be considered for employees under the NLRA. 
Professor Amy McCormick is also an Emeritus Professor
here at Michigan State University. Together with her
husband, Professor Robert McCormick, she has authored
numerous publications examining the status of college 
athletes. The thesis from their 2006 publication in the 
Washington Law Review was instrumental in the action by 
football players at Northwestern University in 2014 to 
pursue union representation. And our last panel member is 
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist, who is the Robert A. Woods 
Professor of Economics at Smith College. He has consulted 
in the sports industry for players’ associations, cities, 
companies, teams, and leagues. Dr. Zimbalist has published
several dozen articles and twenty-two books on the
economics of sport. And now to get us started, Mr. Adam. 
John G. Adam: Almost one year ago, Regional Director 
Peter Ohr of the National Labor Relations Board in Chicago 
ruled that the Northwestern scholarship football players were 
employees under the National Labor Relations Act and had 
the right to organize. I want to tell you about the National 
Labor Relations Act, about the Northwestern football players,
and explain how this [decision] came about and what it could 
mean.
Now, I checked my email just before I spoke because as you 
know we're expecting a decision from the NLRB on 
Northwestern’s appeal. As you know, the Regional Director 
issued his decision, but that decision was appealed to the full 
board in Washington and that's where it's pending. We don't 
know when the NLRB will issue its decision. 
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Today, I want to give you an overview of the National Labor 
Relations Act. I want to explain how the case was presented. 
I want to explain basic legal principles. As law students, you 
might find it interesting to figure out how the case came about 
and how I got involved? 
The petition for an election is how you start an organizing 
drive. I brought a copy of the petition. We needed at least 30%
of the employees to say they're interested in pursuing a right to 
organize.
We filed the petition in the Northwestern case on January 28, 
2014. That has never been done before in the history of college 
sports. The filing of the petition was very significant in and of 
itself,. The fact that players would sign representation cards or 
express interest in unionization was a monumental event. Many 
said it would never happen, because . . . the relationship 
between the players and the university is very close. So, it was 
significant that a petition was filed. 
And some ask why was it filed at the NLRB? Well, as law 
students you know there is federal and state law. Private 
companies, or private universities, like Northwestern, are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act. 
Michigan State University, on the other hand, is subject to the 
Michigan Public Employment Relations Act. So,
Northwestern and MSU are regulated by a different set of 
labor laws,. Because Northwestern is a private university to 
assert legal rights to organize, the players had to file the 
petition with the NLRB. 
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If you're in a state that has employee recognition rights you 
file at the state equivalent, sometimes called state-NLRBs.  
So, CAPA, the union that filed the petition at Northwestern, 
decided to go to the NLRB because that's where we got the 
authorization cards. 
What did we do after we filed the petition? The NLRB holds 
a hearing where you present testimony, you cross-examine
witnesses, and then you submit briefs.
In our case, we presented our case, primarily through the 
testimony of the Northwestern team Captain and quarterback 
Kain Colter. His testimony was crucial in establishing the
basic facts.. So, primarily through Kain Colter's testimony
and through the documents—and the NCAA loves
documents. Indeed, the NCAA requires universities to 
document the day-in-and-day-out life of a football player. And
so how do you prove whether these football players are
employees. What is the legal standard? The Board has created 
legal standards for employees’ status. For example, does the 
employer control, supervise? Does the employer direct the 
employee? Is compensation provided to the employee? It is 
a commonsense approach . . . . Once you understand what 
college football players do in Division One you see it is an 
employment relationship, at least that was the conclusion 
that I came to, if you apply just the normal principles. Do 
they perform services for the university? Are they 
compensated? Are they under the direction and control of the 
employer? These are the basic elements . . .
Now, when we started out doing this, we didn't write from a 
clean slate. Professors Robert and Amy McCormick 
published a law review article in 2006 that described the 
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myth of the student-athlete. Their article applied the NLRB 
legal standards to football and basketball players. They laid
the foundation for really what became ultimately . . . part of 
our argument. 
For those of you on law review, understand law review 
articles can make a difference because people do read them 
and here is an example of one that had an impact. The 
elements we needed to prove were in the McCormick’s’
article with one distinction I'll talk about later. 
After the McCormick's published their article in Labor and 
Employment Lawnotes. We published a condensed version
in 2007. And the article was called: Are College Athletes 
Employees?. Nice headline, right? I was the Associate 
Editor, and I remember the article, and I thought there are 
some good points. Little did I know that eight years later, I 
would be one of the lawyers presenting evidence in Chicago 
on these points. 
You may ask how did a lawyer rom Royal Oak, Michigan get 
involved in a Northwestern, a Chicago case. Well, the simple 
answer is, is CAPA, the union that filed the petition, was
supported by the Steelworkers Union, not for financial
reasons, —the steelworkers have no interest in organizing
college athletes— but the Steelworkers have been
instrumental in helping athletes asset legal rights. 
Marvin Miller, who revolutionized labor unions for Major 
League Baseball, was once with the Steelworkers. He left the 
Steelworkers to run the Baseball Players Union. He was 
instrumental in removing many of the barriers that the 
baseball players faced back then in terms of free agency and 
collective bargaining. It may be hard to believe, but not that
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long ago, professional athletes were not being paid millions
of dollars a year. Not that long ago, they were severely
restricted by the owners and by the system that had been set
up. And so, Marvin Miller, took over the players union from
a traditional labor background. He was able to bring that 
experience to the Major League Baseball players. Now you
see what has happened. The professional athletes are now
enjoying very good salaries and baseball and professional 
sports are growing. There's money to be made in all of these 
sports. So, the Steelworkers have had an interest in athletes 
and it's been helping Ramogi Huma, the head of CAPA, in 
his efforts to have legislative changes to protect athletes, 
college athletes, from concussions; to try to get legislation in
various states to provide medical insurance; to provide some 
level of protections to the college athletes. So, when Ramogi
and others were able to organize, they reached out to the 
steelworkers and because I've handled a lot of National 
Labor Relations Board cases over the years, that's how I got
involved. 
And, my co-counsel was Gary Coleman, an excellent lawyer,
who is now General Counsel to the NBA Players Union. So, 
we were able to bring a variety of legal talent and 
experience. My experience basically was the NLRB, the nuts
and bolts. How do you get a petition? How do you get the 
card? How do you file the petition? What do you do at a 
hearing? Because a hearing at the NLRB is not a normal 
trial. There is a hearing officer, but it's an adversarial 
although it's not supposed to be. But, my experience at the
Board came in handy in presenting this case. I know a formal 
regional director who said “well, you apply the NLRA model to 
this, you know, but does that model really fit?” And my answer 
is, what other model is there? It is federal law that decides 
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whether someone is an employee. And we presented that model 
and established what I thought was an overwhelming case for 
an employment relationship. So, that's kind of the background 
as to the NLRB, you know how it works. So, when we filed a 
petition we then had to present a case. OK.  So you present a 
case kind of in a room like this. Actually we ended up, we were 
at a small conference room at the board. But, because the media 
attention was so great they sent us to the federal courthouse. 
Now, I've litigated many NLRB cases but this not your normal 
case. There was a lot of media attention to it obviously, which I 
expected. So, we had a hearing in the federal courthouse in 
Chicago, and we presented Kain Colter's testimony. And people 
ask me, “when do you think you won the case?” Good lawyers 
always think they win the case at every point. [laughter]. All 
right. I'm always thinking I'm winning the case. [laughter]. But 
at one point after Kain Colter testified, it was pretty much all 
day testimony, and he was subjected to cross-examination, I 
thought it is established. There is nothing they can do to undo
that record evidence. And the record evidence is that college 
football players work four to five or more hours a day, for 
months and months of the year, and then twenty to thirty hours 
in the off-season. It is a year round job that requires them to 
give blood, sweat, toil, and tears, under the direct control and 
supervision of their coaches and the university. The dominant 
control that the university has over college athletes is akin to an 
employment relationship, even greater. So, once the evidence 
came in as to the hours spent, 6 a.m. because Northwestern has 
their practices in the morning. They get there at six a.m. They 
have to get taped-up. They have to get prepared. 
Even their eating was regulated. Where they live was regulated. 
What Facebook they had was regulated. The classes, while 
Northwestern College players are good students and have a 
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high graduation rate, football dominated their lives. And other 
universities, it’s even probably greater. 
Northwestern is a great university. It is a great employer. The 
university has an extensive staff devoted to the football 
program. The coaches, the athletics departments, the assistant 
coaches, the trainers, when you actually look at the football 
handbook you'll be amazed at the number of coaches and 
assistant coaches, and staff and trainers. It is mind-boggling the 
amount of resources devoted to it. 
Everyone is paid from the athletic department, to the coaches,
to the assistant coaches. Everyone is paid and is treated as an 
employment relationship. The only ones . . . that aren’t treated 
as employees are the ones who perform the service-the players.
Everyone from their level up is treated as an employee. So, the 
people that perform the service, that actually risk their bodies
and risk injuries, and who spend hours and hours, are not 
treated as employees. 
We showed at the hearing an employment relationship. And we 
did. I took Kain Colter through his testimony of a day in the life 
of a football player, from the preseason to the regular season, to 
the postseason. Pre-season starts in August. And it goes all the 
way to early January. Now, it's even extended further with the 
super bowl of college football, the F.S.B., the playoff system, 
they are playing until January.
The work is an ongoing process and ongoing commitment of 
hours and resources. And we established that through Kain 
Colter. And we also established it through other evidence. And 
one piece of evidence that I liked to use, Kain didn’t like 
because it was 2012 game that Northwestern played against U 
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M. The Hail Mary game, the one that Northwestern lost in 
overtime. But I told Kain you know you've got to take one for 
the team. [laughter]. 
And so we used the NU/UM Hail Mary game as an example of 
a week in the life of a football player. Kain testified about it 
and we had the schedules. We call them “work schedules.”
You got to be here at 6:30 a.m., you got to be here at 10:00
a.m.. You've got to come back to eat.
The football coaches regulate, what players eat, They have to eat
the team meal. As part of their stipend they have to eat the 
Team Meals so it comes out of their stipend, which is part of
the compensation. So you're getting a stipend, but then you 
gotta eat the food, which Kain said really wasn’t that good, 
but they had no choice. So I had Kain testify about the 
program. As I mentioned, the example I thought was 
particularly compelling was the game against UM. The game 
was on Saturday afternoon. The NU players leave Evanston, 
Illinois, on Friday morning about 8 a.m. From 8 a.m. on until 
midnight Saturday, there is nothing but football. They go 
through team meetings, they go through the game plan, they
do walkthroughs etc. 
We know the physical part of the game. But many people 
don't realize football requires many hours watching film, 
studying the game plan and other team. It is a full-time job to 
understand to play football and to play it at a high level of 
Division One. 
So, Kain talked about the Northwestern game against UM.
And it was 26-27 hours or more. And this excludes sleep 
time, If you look at the NCAA regulations—and I'm sure that
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my panelist can talk about this is well, —the regulations 
regulate everything that the players supposed to do and cannot 
do.
How many, many of you heard of the 20 hour rule? Athletes 
are only supposed to, remember you have the 20 hour rule. Of 
course, this depends on how you define hours, because of 
“CARA”—that is how the NCAA counts hours. CARA excludes
about 30 to 40 hours a week, The NCAA calls it “Countable 
Athletic Related Activities” CARA. You may have heard about 
some coaches getting in trouble because they did not fill out the 
CARA form, which records how much time is devoted to the 
sport? And for whatever reason the numbers always magically fit 
within the NCAA rules as to hours. I have never seen any report 
being submitted that shows it above the NCAA allowed hours. 
That is because the NCAA counts hours’ of work much differently 
than you or I. Again, for the whole day that the Northwestern 
players spent on Friday, traveling from Evanston to Ann Arbor, the 
time spent in team meetings, the time preparing, and the NCAA 
records is as for 1.2 hours. I looked at this 1.2 hours and I said 
“Kain, are we sure about this?” and he said, “yeah, that’s probably 
right.” Kain asked in jest “I wonder how they came up with those 
.2 hours?” (Laughter) So then we review the game day on Saturday 
and Kain describes how on Saturday, they get up, they have to 
meet, they do this extensive preparation. They don’t just put on 
their pads. Team meetings, preparation. 
In the end, for that whole game day, they counted, three hours. 
Because that’s what the NCAA says a game takes to play. Even 
though the players start at 7 a.m. and they get back to Evanston 
around 1 a.m. the next day. 
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When Kain and I and others were preparing for the NLRA hearing, 
and we decided this is a good example to drive home the hours 
spent by the players. 
And that’s what you do as a lawyer, you figure out how you to tell 
the story, how to present a case. You have to tell a story, and you 
got to make the story interesting. So we used examples after we 
went through the overview. Then we focus on particulars. 
And this turned out to be a good thing, because NLRB Regional 
Director Peter Ohr’s decision, cites the UM Hail Mary Game. 
So when you’re presenting a case, you ask how you are going to 
create a record. The NCAA uses the term student-athlete, right? 
Student first, -- athlete, it’s like it has to be connected, you can 
never separate the two. And we said, yes a football player is a
student but he is also an athlete. And they are separate and distinct 
roles. That is what we established. We showed the role of a 
football player is separate and distinct from the role of a student. 
There is no connection other than the fact that to play football at 
the universities, you must be a student. 
Now that’s one area where we differed in part from what Professor 
McCormick’s’ had addressed in their law review article. They had 
evidence that in many programs, that the athletes are not students 
or at least not even close to being a student. They don’t attend 
classes, or they take classes that aren’t academically challenging. 
They’re provided tutors.
That’s not the case at Northwestern and so we didn’t need to get 
into make such a claim. We made it simple: “Yes they’re 
students,” and “yes these athletes are also very good students,” but 
what their roles as student and athlete are separate and distinct. 
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We presented facts as to what they do and how they are 
compensated. I want to talk briefly about compensation because to 
be an employee you have to be compensated, although there are 
some people who are being exploited as interns who are not paid 
but are still employees---but that’s a separate issue. So, we showed
how the players received compensation. We said the scholarship-
grants-in-aid-and are payments. We did not run away from it. In 
fact, we said yes the players are compensated. Indeed, 
Northwestern compensates them with a very good scholarship
because it is an expensive university. NU provides room and board
to the scholarship players. That is compensation and it is for 
services performed. It’s not a gift.
And up until recently, the NCAA, the rules allowed one-year 
scholarships. Think of the control gives the university over a 
player. You don’t perform, you’re done. The new coach does not 
need the player anymore. They put pressure on the player to leave 
or they don’t have to renew the scholarship. Now, the 
Northwestern football program, wasn’t like that. But the system
was set up. 
So it becomes clear, when you apply, what Kain did, and what he’s 
compensated for---tuition, and then eventually room and board.
When a player lives off campus, that’s regulated. To live in an 
apartment, Kain testified that he had to give his lease to his coach. 
Not that the coach is a bad guy, but the coach has to make sure that 
it’s not an improper lease, like a someone is giving the player a 
fancy, beautiful place in downtown Chicago for a $100. . Or they 
may not the player to live in a bad area. So they review the lease.
As to other matters we addressed, Kain wanted to go home on over 
the Christmas break before a bowl game. To do so, Kain had to 
provide a flight schedule. Because NU wants to make sure you’re 
14
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss1/6
Fall] Pay for Play 193
 
going to come back a certain time so you can practice. These are 
just examples of the day-to-day control that the universities have 
over the players. 
Dr. Zimbalist will talk about it the value of the services Division 1
college football is a $6 billion industry and growing. The services 
the athletes provide are enormously valuable. Not just in revenue, 
not just in . . . in what it brings the university in terms of the fans 
and the alumni. It elevates the status of universities in a way that is 
immeasurable. They call it the Flutie-effect, after then-Boston QB
Doug Flutie. If your team wins a bowl game, the university 
becomes better known, elevated, so more people apply. This 
creates an atmosphere that is great for business. 
It is a business. When the National Labor Relations Act was passed 
in 1935, the NLRB, did not apply the federal law to private 
universities, Why not? Because the NLRB ruled that universities 
were not  “commercial enterprises.” Well, the NLRB changed that 
rule decades later when the NLRB found that private universities 
are commercial enterprises. And so the NLRB extended the right 
to organize to all university employees. 
Well, now we’re going to change it for college athletes. Division 1
college athletes—, where the work, and the hours, and the 
schedule,—meets the definition of employee status under the 
NLRA, federal law. 
We won the case, I thought when Coach Fitzgerald testified, 
because he didn’t refute anything that Kain said about the hours, 
the schedule---nothing. In fact, Kain testified that Fitz is a great 
coach. Fitz even set ups a players’ committee consisting of a
freshman, sophomore, junior, senior. And the players were to elect 
one representative from year each year to be on the committee. 
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They would meet with the coach every couple of weeks, and they
would discuss problems Sounds like a union. The coach testified, 
“Yes, he’s part of that committee, but he has 51% of the vote and 
that he runs the program. 
Again Coach Fitz did not really challenge the underlying facts in 
the case about the hours, etc. So, at that I point I thought, we have 
a very good chance of winning, and that was all in February of last 
year. 
It all happened very quickly, and on March 26, 2014, Regional 
Director ruled in our favor. Then the university appealed to the 
board in Washington D.C. , which has the case. Many amicus 
briefs we also filed. And it’s up there. I hope we’ll win, I believe 
we should win. Every lawyer knows the case is not over until you 
get the final decision and there are no more appeals. 
But whatever happens, I think the players at Northwestern deserve 
and Kain Colter deserves great credit for bringing to the public’s 
attention the need for reform. And whether that reform comes from 
the NLRB or through antitrust litigation or through other things 
that are taking place, the players need some basic rights that they 
don’t have. Thank you. [applause].
Matthew Morrow: Thank you very much Mr. Adam. We’ll move 
on now to Professor McCormick. And just a note on the questions, 
we’ll save all of the questions until after all of the panelists have 
presented and then we will open up the floor. Thank you.
Professor Robert McCormick: I would like to thank Dean
Howarth, Ms. Lescheck, and the other members of the Journal for 
putting this Symposium together.  It is a terrific panel, and I’m 
honored to be a part of it. 
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I should start by saying I find it wonderfully ironic that we’re 
enjoying this symposium on the opening weekend of March 
Madness. And that’s because it was more than a decade ago that 
Amy and I, during just such an annual basketball-watching frenzy, 
began to have the ideas that ultimately led us to our conclusion that 
football and men’s basketball players at NCAA institutions are 
employees, not merely “student-athletes.”   
While we were watching the games, we began to wonder why the 
NCAA was devoting so much time and money to repeating the 
idea that college athletes at NCAA institutions are “student-
athletes.”  And if you watch the tournament at all, you surely know 
these ads. Originally, the theme was that these young people would 
be “going pro in something else.” That went on for many years.
Usually a swimmer or an athlete of that variety, in this case a 
swimmer, would emerge from a swimming pool and somehow 
morph into an airline pilot. Later the theme became that college 
sports is “not the finish line,” depicting a track athlete leaning to 
reach the tape, or a baseball player sliding home. The idea was that 
the finish line is something else. Most recently, the central theme 
of these ads seems to be that the NCAA is a cheerleader,
supporting the athletes and on their side. We will be very curious 
as to what the next theme will be, but the ads will begin to appear 
soon, especially as the tournament continues. In any event, they
will feature athletes from sports other than the revenue-generating 
sports of football and men’s basketball, and they will emphasize 
that athletes are learning important “life lessons” by participating 
in intercollegiate athletics.
We wondered why the NCAA was relentlessly airing these 
promotional ads. After all, advertising space for March Madness is 
very, very expensive, and therefore, the NCAA was foregoing a lot 
of potential income by devoting time solely to promoting the idea 
of the “student-athlete.”  It seemed like propaganda, and it 
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occurred to us that the NCAA was essentially protesting too much.  
Perhaps the relentless insistence on college athletes being 
designated as “student-athletes” was to mask the idea that they 
were actually something else.  
At the same time, as luck would have it, Amy was reading Walter 
Byers’s autobiography, Unsportsmanlike Conduct.1 For those of 
you who don’t know who Walter Byers is, he was, for decades, the 
Executive Director of the NCAA, and the man under whom the 
NCAA grew from a small association to the economic powerhouse
it is today. His book, written in his retirement, was something of a 
confessional about the transformation of the NCAA into this 
economic powerhouse on his watch and under his leadership. 
Byers’ book was critical in the development of our thesis, because 
it revealed that the NCAA invented the term “student-athlete” in 
direct response to a 1953 Colorado Supreme Court decision2 that 
an injured football player was an “employee” and entitled to 
workers’ compensation for his injuries. 
This decision alarmed the NCAA greatly, and it reacted swiftly.
As Byers wrote: The “threat [from Nemeth] was the dreaded notion 
that NCAA athletes could be identified as employees by state 
industrial commissions and the courts.”3 To address that threat, he 
wrote, “We crafted the term student-athlete, and soon it was 
embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as a mandated 
substitute for such words as players and athletes.”4 Thereafter, all 
NCAA universities were required to identify their athletes as 
“student-athletes.”
From this insight, it was no leap for us to conclude that of course 
                                                             
1 WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING 
COLLEGE ATHLETES (1995). 
2 Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953). 
3 BYERS, supra note 1, at 69 (emphasis in original). 
4 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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the NCAA would be alarmed at a determination that an athlete was 
an employee because universities, after all, have agreed among 
themselves for decades to limit athletes’ compensation to the level 
of tuition, room, board and books. And those rules, in turn, have 
enabled schools to reap fantastic financial and other benefits, as 
John just described, from the athletes’ labor, their time, their 
energy, and their talents, while severely limiting the cost of that 
labor. What employer wouldn’t want that?  By creating and 
maintaining the idea of the “student-athlete,” and that college 
sports are “amateur,” the NCAA and its member universities have,
like no other association, institution, or business in this country,
been able to obtain the benefits of highly valuable labor—in this 
case the labor that is the product itself—without paying a 
competitive wage for it. 
We knew college sports had become a highly commercial 
enterprise and that CBS, for example, at that time had paid the 
NCAA $6 billion, or $550 million a year, for the rights to televise 
just the March basketball tournament for eleven years.5 By the 
way, in 2011 CBS and Turner Broadcasting raised that figure to 
$10.8 billion or $770 million a year for fourteen years.6 We also 
knew that salaries being paid to coaches had been skyrocketing. 
For those of you who don’t know, Nick Saban’s current salary 
exceeds $7 million a year for eight years, or more than 
$56 million.7 And, in fact, some college coaches now make more 
than their professional counterparts.8 The average salary for the top 
                                                             
5 See Welch Suggs, Big Money in College Sports Flows to the Few, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 29, 2004, at A46. 
6 Michael Wilbon, College Athletes Deserve to be Paid, ESPN.COM, Jul. 18, 
2011, http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6778847/college-
athletes-deserve-paid.  
7 NCAA Salaries: 2015 NCAAF Coaches, USA TODAY, 
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
8 Dennis Dodd, Will You Be Outraged if Nick Saban is College Football’s First 
$8 Million Man?, CBSSPORTS.COM, Feb. 11, 2016, 
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twenty-five football college coaches is now $3.85 million a year.9
Such coaches are almost always the highest paid public 
employees in their states. 
I know these figures can be numbing, but I want you to 
consider just a couple of things. In 2015, March Madness
will bring in $1 billion in television advertising revenue for 
CBS and Turner. That is more revenue than the Super Bowl,
and almost as much as the entire NFL postseason.  And one 
final fact, the ten largest football stadiums in America are all 
college football stadiums.10
If the NCAA ads were propaganda as they appeared, then we 
wondered, was the Colorado court correct back in 1953? Are 
these athletes, in fact, employees? While I am a labor lawyer, 
this question had never occurred to me. Of course this
question leads to the basic, foundational question: What is an 
employee? It is a question that often arises in the 
employment context. For example, there are cases pending in 
the federal courts today to determine whether drivers for 
Uber and Lyft, which as you know better than I, are private 
taxi services, are “employees” as the drivers argue, or 
“independent contractors” as Uber and Lyft contend. The 
reason this is an important distinction is because employees 
enjoy a wide range of rights, including the right to form 
unions and to bargain collectively under the National Labor 
Relations Act, that independent contractors do not enjoy. 




9 Matt Murschel, Season of Parity Perfect for Playoff, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 
6, 2014. 
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So, how does one determine whether someone is an
employee. Many of you are law students, so you’re going to
be familiar with this drill, and John has already run you 
through it to some degree, but let me lay it out for you, and 
then you can decide for yourself whether these football and
men’s basketball players are, or are not, employees.
The primary common law standard is the so-called “right of
control” test that John has already alluded to and that
constitutes the template by which to make this determination. 
The standard looks to whether the person: (1) performs 
services for another; (2) in return for compensation; and (3) 
subject to the control or the right of control of the employer 
over the activities of the work life of the employee.11 As the 
NLRB has written, “an employee is a person who performs
services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the
other’s control or right of control, and in return for 
payment.”12 From time to time, the NLRB also looks at the 
“economic realities” of the relationship, that is to say, the 
degree to which the putative employee is economically 
dependent upon the putative employer.13
We were also aware that the NLRB had been visiting and 
revisiting the question of whether graduate teaching and
research assistants at private universities were employees
under the National Labor Relations Act. And because
graduate assistants and football players are both students as
well, perhaps, as employees, we thought the Board’s 
reasoning in this area might shed light on our theory.
                                                             
11 Brown University, 342 NLRB  483, 490 n.27 (2004). 
12 Id. 
13 See A. Paladini, Inc., 168 NLRB 952, 952 (1967) (applying right-of-control 
test “in light of the economic realities”); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON 
LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 30 (1976). 
21
Discussion: Pay for Play: Unionization and the Business of the NCAA
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
200 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16
 
Let me just give you a little bit of background on the 
graduate assistant situation because it’s relevant to my talk. 
In 2004, the NLRB—in a case involving Brown 
University—overturned an earlier holding and held that 
graduate assistants were not employees under the NLRA 
because they “perform[ed] services at a university in 
connection with their studies, [and had] . . . a predominately
academic, rather than economic, relationship with their
school.”14 “[G]raduate student assistants,” the Board wrote, 
“are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not 
economic, relationship with their university.”15
Thus, despite the fact that the graduate assistants at Brown 
University met the common law test—that is, they performed
services in return for compensation and were under the
control of their university—their central purpose in being 
graduate assistants was not commercial but academic. They 
were pursuing further education, and their relationship with 
the universities, the Board decided, was primarily 
educational, not economic.
Our task, then, was to consider whether college athletes were 
employees under the common law and Brown University
standards to determine whether they were employees under
the National Labor Relations Act. There was no question in 
our mind—as John just described—that football and men’s
basketball players perform valuable services—incredibly
valuable services—for their universities.  Nor was there any 
question in our minds that they are compensated for those
services by having the cost of their education provided by the
universities.
                                                             
14 Brown, 342 NLRB at 483. 
15 Id. at 487. 
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Under common law, thus, the only remaining question had to 
do with the degree of control and right of control that the 
universities held over the athletes. And since we knew very 
little about the actual lives of college football players and
men’s basketball players, we undertook to investigate the
reality of those lives. From that, we could learn to what 
degree these young men were serving under the control of 
their coaches in athletic departments and whether they were 
economically dependent upon their universities. Doing so
would also help show us whether or not the athletes were 
“primarily students,” with a “primarily educational 
relationship” with their universities.
To learn more, we interviewed a number of then-current and 
former NCAA football and men’s basketball players, and 
their stories bore remarkable similarities. In short, we 
learned that not only are their football and basketball duties 
closely monitored, but many details of their personal lives 
are carefully controlled by coaches and athletic staff, not 
only during the season, but year-around. During the season, a
conservative estimate of a college football player’s time
commitment to football is at least fifty hours per week. At the
same time, they are required by NCAA rules to take twelve
credit hours each semester, but may not enroll in classes that
conflict with practice—thereby essentially foreclosing
afternoon classes for many of them.16 In the offseason, their
lives remain under the close control of their coaches. Indeed,
even in the summer, they are required to remain on campus
during the week and could leave only with the coach’s
                                                             
16 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the 
Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 100, 
142 & nn.326-28 (2006). Eliminating afternoon classes had the effect of 
preventing athletes from choosing certain majors, like those in some 
science subjects that required afternoon lab sessions.  Id.   
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permission.
The Regional Director’s decision in the Northwestern case
describes an extensive list of the demands placed on football 
players at that university, and I urge you to read the
opinion.17 It is a very clear, simple, straightforward opinion 
that won’t take you very long. And it will lay out, as John 
has already described, some of the details of the athletes’ 
lives. In fact, as I recall in the Northwestern case, the football 
players were required to return to campus on Christmas Day 
so they could practice for the upcoming bowl game. Am I
right about that?
John G. Adam: Yeah.
Professor Robert McCormick: In addition, the athletes’
depictions of their dependence upon their universities were 
surprisingly similar and, in my mind, actually quite poignant.
Many football players and men’s basketball players come
from families with very limited economic resources. Plus,
NCAA rules prohibit them from receiving gifts—even
meals—and prevent them from profiting from their 
reputation as athletes or from receiving royalties for the sale 
of the jerseys that bear their numbers. The reality is that 
many of these athletes live below the poverty line, and again 
Amy will get into this in a minute. In short, we reached the 
conclusion that these young men are under the pervasive 
control of their coaches and athletic departments—in fact,
more control than is experienced by any other employee at
this university, and at all major NCAA universities. Many of 
them are wholly dependent upon the universities—even for 
                                                             
17 Northwestern Univ. and College Athlete Players Ass’n (CAPA), 13-RC-
121359 (N.L.R.B. Region 13, Mar. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.espn.go.com/pdf/2014/0326/espn_uniondecision.PDF.  
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food and shelter. And because they perform their services
under a contract in return for compensation, they appeared to 
us to clearly meet the common law standard of employee.
This did not end our inquiry, however, because the Brown
standard imposes a requirement in addition to the common 
law standard.  Under Brown, the next question is whether the 
services these athletes perform are “primarily educational” or 
whether, instead, those services for their universities are 
primarily commercial or economic. By this measure, the
answer became clear to us as well. The weight of the 
evidence demonstrated to us that although some of these 
athletes earn a degree, the majority of them are not primarily
students with regard to the athletic services they provide. I 
emphasize primarily because that’s the Board’s language.
Graduate assistants at Brown University were primarily 
students, the Board found when they provided teaching and 
research services at that university. Our question, thus, was 
whether or not football and men’s basketball players at 
NCAA universities were primarily students with respect to 
their athletic services?
In our view, many of these athletes are inadequately 
prepared for academic inquiry and, once enrolled, face 
enormous—I would say, virtually insurmountable—
obstacles to fully experiencing the intellectual aspect of 
university life. Their primary purpose at the university with 
regard to their athletic services is not to advance their 
intellect. That purpose is to contribute to successful athletic 
teams. 
One shocking fact came to our attention during all of this. 
Under NCAA rules, a high school senior who misses every 
single question on the SAT, but who has a grade point 
average of 3.55 in certain core courses may still be admitted
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to an NCAA member school where he will be eligible (and
expected) to compete immediately as a freshman in
intercollegiate athletics.18 The NCAA, quite frankly, requires 
no demonstration of any objective academic ability 
whatsoever to become eligible. And while a 3.55 GPA may
sound academically demanding, grades have notoriously been
subject to manipulation by high school teachers and
administrators seeking to help athletes make it into college 
athletics. Moreover, special, and sometimes sham, high
schools have proliferated to enable athletes to obtain the
requisite grades necessary to render them eligible for NCAA 
competition.19
Once they arrive on campus, extensive practice and playing 
schedules monopolize their lives and leave little time for 
academic pursuits. Weak curricula also characterize many 
athletes’ college experiences. Universities regularly devise
majors with minimal academic rigor to enable athletes to 
devote maximum time to their sports. Athletes reported to us 
passing classes they rarely attended; having tutors sometimes
do their work for them; being told in advance which version 
of an exam would be administered; being allowed to take an 
oral test in lieu of a regular exam; and similar academic
misconduct. One basketball course at the University of 
Georgia did have a twenty-question final exam. Among the 
questions were: “How many halves are in a college 
basketball game?” and, “How many points does a 3-point 
field goal account for in a Basketball Game?”20
                                                             
18 NCAA, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14.3.1.1.2 (2015) (initial-
eligibility index). 
19 See Tom Farrey, It’s All Academic Now, ESPN.COM, Oct. 31, 2002, 
http://espn.go.com/columns/farrey_tom/1453693.html.  
20 Mark Schlabach, Varsity Athletes Get Class Credit; Some Colleges Give 
Grades for Playing, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A1; Lexus Halftime Show: 
Michigan—Notre Dame Game (NBC television broadcast Sept. 11, 2004). 
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The recent scandal last year at the University of North 
Carolina speaks volumes about this issue. There, for years—
and this is a distinguished American university—basketball 
players and men’s football players received credit for 
fraudulent “paper” classes in the Department of African and 
Afro-American Studies. One counselor, Mary Willingham, 
reported having worked with athletes who could neither read 
nor even recognize letters. One athlete wanted her to help 
him learn to read so he could read the newspaper clippings
about his performance.
From all of this we concluded that although there are notable 
exceptions, football and men’s basketball players are not 
primarily students and their athletic services are not 
primarily educational, but instead they have a primarily 
commercial and economic relationship with their 
universities. In the end, we concluded that NCAA athletes in 
revenue-generating sports meet the common law standard,
the NLRB “right of control” standard, the “economic 
realities” standard, and the Brown University standard. As a 
result, we concluded, they are employees under the National
Labor Relations Act. It is by the virtue of their labor, after all,
that intercollegiate athletics has become this dazzlingly
commercial activity.
Our thesis raises a lot of questions. Should athletes be able to 
receive a market-based or a collectively bargained wage? 
What about athletes in nonrevenue-generating sports? Or
non-scholarship athletes? Their lives are tough, too. Are they 
employees, also? What would the adoption of our theory do
to colleges whose athletic budgets are already strapped?
As Yogi Berra once said: “It’s tough to make predictions,
especially about the future.” These are all valid questions, and 
I think our symposium will give us a chance to think about 
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them a lot.  My particular point—really my only point—is
that scholarship football players and men’s basketball players 
at NCAA institutions are employees under the law. We may
not like that conclusion, and in fact I often wish it weren’t
true. I would much prefer it if college sports were, in fact,
amateur and if colleges were not exploiting some of their 
students. Unfortunately, our conclusion that at least football 
and men’s basketball players are employees is inescapable. 
I’m fond of saying that if anyone is an employee at these 
universities, these young men are. Recognition of that 
reality, as the Regional Director did in the Northwestern
case, will raise a lot of difficult questions for the NCAA and 
its member institutions.  That these challenges may be 
daunting, however, is no excuse for denying justice to the 
athletes that create our beloved college sports. Thank you
very much.
Professor Amy McCormick: I am Amy McCormick. It is
nice to have all of you here. I appreciate your attending. I 
want to thank Dean Howarth, the Law College, the Journal, 
and its editors for sponsoring this symposium. The topic is 
timely, and because college sports is such a big business, I
think it is really wonderful that you decided to explore it. 
You have also outdone yourselves in getting such a great 
group of experts together to talk about the issues facing 
college sports today. Both panels have truly top-notch 
authorities who have explored these questions in depth. So 
thank you for getting us all together.
I will begin my comments by reminding you that NCAA
rules and the practices of universities’ athletic departments 
do not operate in a vacuum. They impact real people and real 
lives. They have economic, educational, and health and 
safety consequences. There is much to say about the 
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educational and health and safety consequences of NCAA 
rules, but because of the nature of our symposium today, I 
will limit most of my thoughts to the economic 
consequences.
A 2011 study found that the room and board provisions in 
so-called full scholarships left approximately six out of every 
seven players living below the federal poverty line.21 These 
data have been reflected in the comments of numerous 
athletes over the years, most recently when Shabazz Napier, 
a basketball player on the national championship 
Connecticut Huskies, said there are nights athletes go to bed 
hungry because they do not have enough money for food. 
Only after this issue embarrassed the NCAA on national 
television did it begin taking some steps to reduce the 
likelihood of athlete hunger. But this was only after decades 
of hearing about the problem and doing almost nothing to 
correct it. The steps taken now seem more like a public 
relations effort than a real movement to treat athletes 
properly given that none of the changes requires colleges to 
increase athlete aid22 and given that college sports brings in 
billions of dollars every year.23 Even now, many schools are 
                                                             
21 RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME 
COLLEGE SPORT 4 (2011), http://www.ncpanow.org/research/study-the-
price-of-poverty-in-big-time-college-sport (noting that 85% of “full” 
scholarship players living on campus, and 86% living off campus, live in 
poverty). 
22 NCAA, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL arts. 2.13, 15.01.6, 15.02.2, 
15.02.5, 15.1 (2015) (describing cost of attendance as being the maximum 
amount an institution is permitted to provide an athlete). 
23 Patrick Hruby, Four Years a Student-Athlete: The Racial Injustice of Big-
Time College Sports, VICE SPORTS, Apr. 6, 2016, 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/four-years-a-student-athlete-the-
racial-injustice-of-big-time-college-sports (reporting economist Dan 
Rascher estimates that Division I football and men’s basketball generate 
between $10 billion and $12 billion annually).  
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still balking at the suggestion that athletic scholarships 
should be allowed to cover the full cost of attending college.
College football and men’s basketball are exceedingly 
lucrative industries, generating billions of dollars a year. 
Although athletes are the primary labor input in this industry, 
NCAA amateurism rules require them to be paid only in the 
form of an athletic scholarship which is often worth 
markedly less than the value they create24 and can also fall 
significantly short of the actual cost of attendance.25 Recent 
proposals to increase scholarships to cost of attendance do 
not require greater compensation. They merely raise the cap 
on compensation. Schools are still permitted to set 
scholarships below that level.26 In this regard, the NCAA 
functions as a cartel, making it possible for universities to 
collude to pay athletes significantly less than they would be 
willing to pay them if they had to compete in a free market 
for their services.27
Amazingly, the NCAA has succeeded, through decades of 
public relations campaigns, to convince the nation that 
                                                             
24 HUMA & STAUROWSKY, supra note 21, at 4; Hruby, supra note 23; Andrew 
Zimbalist, College Coaches’ Salaries and Higher Education, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Dec. 31, 2014 [hereinafter Zimbalist, Coaches’ Salaries]; Transcript of PBS 
Frontline Interview of Andrew Zimbalist, Professor of Economics, Smith 
College (Jan. 29, 2011), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-and-march-
madness/interviews/andrew-zimbalist.html [hereinafter Zimbalist, 
Frontline].   
25 E.g., Zimbalist, Frontline, supra note 24. 
26 See supra note 22. 
27 E.g., Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of 
Unionizing Student Athletes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the 
Workforce, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 8, 2014)(expanded written testimony 
of Andy Schwarz) at 1; Gary Becker, The NCAA as a Powerful Cartel, THE 
BECKER-POSNER BLOG, Apr. 3, 2011, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/2011/04/the-ncaa-as-a-powerful-cartel-becker.html; Zimbalist, 
Frontline, supra note 24. 
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paying athletes for their services constitutes corruption.28
Nowhere else in America would it be acceptable to say that 
people who have provided valuable talents and marketable 
skills should not be paid for their hard work, especially when 
that work generates billions of dollars. Conveniently for 
NCAA officials, coaches, athletic directors, and conference 
commissioners, who all effectively run that association, 
convincing the public that paying athletes is wrong allows 
them to reserve the money for themselves.29
                                                             
28 See WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT:  
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 371 (1995). 
29 Hruby, supra note 23 (quoting Associate Professor Eddie Comeaux as 
suggesting NCAA rules are purposefully designed to benefit those in 
control); see also Schwarz, supra note 27, at 7; Andy Schwarz, How Not to 
Reform the NCAA, REGRESSING DEADSPIN, Aug. 1, 2014, 
http://regressing.deadspin.com/how-not-to-reform-the-ncaa-
1614553705; Zimbalist, Coaches’ Salaries, supra note 24 (describing how 
amateurism rules imposed on athletes allow coaches’ and athletic directors’ 
salaries to surge beyond their true market values); Zimbalist, Frontline, 
supra note 24 (same). 
 Reserving the vast financial proceeds from college sports for 
themselves has allowed athletic officials to benefit handsomely from 
revenues that would not exist were it not for the athletes’ hard and 
dangerous work.  To name a few examples, in 2013-14, NCAA President 
Mark Emmert earned more than $1.8 million.  National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, IRS Form 990, EIN 44-0567264, FYE Aug. 31, 2014. In the same 
year, Jim Delaney, the Big Ten Conference commissioner, earned about 
$3.4 million, The Big Ten Conference, Inc., IRS Form 990, EIN 36-3640583, 
FYE June 30, 2014, and Pac-12 Conference commissioner, Larry Scott, made 
over $3.5 million.  Pac-12 Conference, IRS Form 990, EIN 94-1459048, FYE 
June 30, 2014.  Coaches also typically make millions of dollars a year in cash 
and other perquisites, while athletic directors, bowl game directors, and 
even assistant coaches also fare very well.  Hruby, supra note 23.  I am 
hardly the first to characterize athletic administrators as operating the 
enterprise of college athletics as a cartel for their own economic benefit.  It 
was insiders, like Walter Byers and Sonny Vaccaro, who revealed these 
problems much earlier.  See BYERS, supra note 28; Taylor Branch, The Shame 
of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 81; 30 for 30: Sole Man (ESPN 
television broadcast) (interviewing Sonny Vaccaro and detailing his rise in 
the athletic apparel industry). 
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In a normal market, employers recruit talent by offering 
higher pay than competitors. So, how does a university 
recruit players when it is not allowed to pay them? Because 
schools have agreed not to compete with each other 
monetarily for athlete services, they wind up competing with 
substitutes for pay:  national exposure; performance of the 
team; facilities; and coaching prestige.30  Of course, national 
exposure and performance of the team are associated with 
the coach. So all the schools compete for the best coaches so 
they can, in turn, attract the best players.31 Coaching pay gets 
artificially driven up to dizzying levels because schools can 
use the value athletes create to supplement the coaches’ 
pay.32 Economists widely agree that athletes’ amateur status 
is the element that contributes most directly to coaches’ 
inflated salaries.33 And if schools were not allowed to 
collude to suppress athlete pay, coaching pay would 
naturally fall to more reasonable levels because some 
“money would flow to . . . athletes instead of to their 
coaches.”34
In the current system, “the money the market would channel 
towards male athletes is [also effectively] diverted into . . . 
other substitutes for direct compensation . . . [—like large, 
luxurious stadiums and] practice facilities.”35 One such 
facility famously includes waterfalls. “There is a reason why 
                                                             
30 Zimbalist, Frontline, supra note 24. 
31 Andy Schwarz, Excuses, Not Reasons: 13 Myths about (Not) Paying College 
Athletes, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxM4wdtZ5uI-
OWFhNGE1ZTItZTllYS00YmVlLTk0YmItYTM4ZDUyY2MwNTE2/view, 
presented at Santa Clara Sports Law Symposium (Sept. 8, 2011) at 59; 
Zimbalist, Frontline, supra note 24. 
32 Zimbalist, Frontline, supra note 24; Hruby, supra note 23. 
33 E.g., Schwarz, supra note 29. 
34 Schwarz, supra note 29, at 7. 
35 Id.; see Schwarz, supra note 31, at 59. 
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FBS locker rooms are more ostentatiously appointed than 
NFL locker rooms – in the NFL, pay is the primary 
recruiting tool, while in FBS[, facilities and coaching
are].”36 Because of university collusion, resources are largely 
being diverted to coaches and facilities to recruit athletes 
indirectly instead of being paid to athletes to recruit them 
directly. Colluding to cap athletes’ compensation is price 
fixing, plain and simple.37 This “price fixing . . . distorts the 
[entire] market, and . . . imposes a high cost on young men, 
many of whom come from families who do not have the 
luxury of shrugging off that economic loss.”38
Not only should athletes have a legal right to seek a share of 
the economic value they create, they also need a share of that 
economic value. “[T]he current collusion among colleges not 
to compete economically is robbing . . . [98% of their] 
athletes[—the ones who will not ‘go pro’39—]of what . . . 
[would have been] their four or five highest earning years in 
their sports careers, and [in some cases in] . . . their entire 
li[ves].”40 It is simply unjust to keep this value from them.
Left to its own devices, the NCAA drags its feet. It inches
towards reform only when there is outside pressure to do so. 
It has taken more than a decade to get the NCAA even to talk 
about the possibility that there is a concussion problem, for 
                                                             
36 Schwarz, supra note 27, at 7 (emphasis added). 
37 Id. at 1, 2. 
38 Id. at 3. 
39 Only 1.2% of NCAA men’s basketball players and 1.6% of NCAA football 
players go on to play in the NBA or NFL. NCAA, Estimated Probability of 
Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA.ORG, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-
competing-professional-athletics (last updated Apr. 9, 2016). 
40 Schwarz, supra note 27, at 6; see Schwarz, supra note 29; see also Hruby, 
supra note 23. 
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example.41 Many of the recent reforms being considered at
some institutions are simply reactions to the bad press and
barrage of legal challenges the NCAA has recently been
facing.42 Those cases have received a lot of public attention, 
and the NCAA seeks to control the damage and repair its
tainted image. So now there is movement to raise the cap on 
athlete pay to cover the full cost of attendance, rather than 
just tuition, room, board, and books.43 And there is
movement to reinstate—on an optional basis—multi-year 
scholarships in place of the scholarships that are limited to a 
single year and renewable at the coach’s unfettered 
discretion.44 Even the multi-year scholarships, however, can 
be revoked fairly easily.45 It is only when there is outside
pressure that reform, however incremental, takes place.
A union of athletes—with the right to talk about their 
concerns and seek better working conditions—would be a 
good mechanism to apply outside pressure to make the NCAA
adopt athlete protections. And “[g]iven the one-sided market
power imposed by collusion, it’s not surprising that the 
players have turned to labor law and unionization for a 
modicum of countervailing bargaining power.”46 A players’
                                                             
41 Sara Ganim, Unnecessary Roughness? Players Question NCAA’s Record on 
Concussions, CNN.COM, Oct. 30, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/10/us/ncaa-concussions/; see also 
CARE-FC, CARE-FC Statement, 1 (Nov. 9, 2015) http://care-fc.org/care-fc-
statement/ (describing decades of litigation by NCAA to avoid addressing 
athlete concerns).  
42 Patrick Hruby, Return of the Full Ride, SPORTS ON EARTH, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/81801184/why-schools-suddenly-
support-four-year-scholarships-for-college-athletes (alleging motives for 




45 CARE-FC, supra note 41, at 4. 
46 Schwarz, supra note 27, at 2; see also id. at 9. 
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union would be a more efficient, much less wasteful, way of
exerting steady outside pressure on the NCAA, rather than
having to resort to constant litigation to enforce athletes’
rights. Just yesterday, Jack Swarbrick, the Athletic Director 
at Notre Dame, echoed this view when he conceded that
unionization might be beneficial by creating cost certainty 
through collective bargaining and by serving as an 
alternative to all the recent litigation.47
As you know, the College Athletes Players Association 
(CAPA), asserting that college football players at 
Northwestern University are employees, has sought to 
organize them. Although I believe athletes should receive
monetary compensation more in line with their fair market
value than what they earn now, CAPA has no plans to seek 
such monetary compensation.48 Unions certainly have the 
right to seek for their members a share of the economic value
they help create. But unions bargain over many matters other 
than wages, too—specifically, hours and “other terms and 
conditions of employment.” Athletes face plenty of non-
wage issues, both educational and health-and-safety related. 
These are what the Northwestern football players are 
concerned about and what CAPA will focus on if certified.49
So, what could a union accomplish for college football and 
men’s basketball players? In the current system, athletes 
often exhaust eligibility, and their scholarships end before 
                                                             
47 Dennis Dodd, Notre Dame AD Has a Vision of Two College Athletic 
Associations, CBSSPORTS.COM, Mar. 18, 2015, 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/dennis-
dodd/25112658/notre-dame-ad-has-a-vision-of-two-college-athletic-
associations.   
48 Kevin Trahan, Questions Dog Players’ Unionization Bid, USA TODAY, 
reprinted in LANSING ST. J., Mar. 31, 2014, at 8C. 
49 Schwarz, supra note 27, at 5. 
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they have enough credits to graduate. These athletes often 
leave school with no degree and little likelihood of being 
able to make it in the professional leagues. By being in a 
union, players “could negotiate for a guarantee that no matter 
how long it takes, . . . [a] student could finish his degree . . . 
after his . . . eligibility [is over].”50 By being in a union, the 
athlete could bargain to ensure he is “given real access to the 
full range of majors and programs at a school, . . . [not just 
the] dead-end majors.”51 A union could bargain to get 
players more time to pursue their coursework. 
A union could also negotiate for healthcare coverage for 
sports-related injuries and could seek health and safety 
requirements, not mere guidelines, that “lower the risk of 
serious head trauma . . . [and] lifelong disability.”52 For 
example, independent concussion experts could be required, 
not merely recommended, to be on the sidelines.53
Finally, legal recognition of a union of players, expressing 
their concerns and views to their employers, would grant 
these young men dignity.54 It would give them the right to 
talk about these issues for the first time and the right to be 
listened to. Being in a union would allow athletes the 
flexibility to bargain for the packages that could serve their
                                                             
50 Id.; see also Schwarz, supra note 31, at 65.  
51 Schwarz, supra note 27, at 5. 
52 Id. 
53 See Editorial Board, NCAA Not Tackling Concussions Yet: Our View: The 
NFL, by Contrast, Has Adopted Tough, Mandatory Rules, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 
2014 (criticizing NCAA for adopting mere voluntary guidelines regarding 
concussions); Ganim, supra note 41 (same). 
54 CARE-FC, supra note 41, at 1, 7 (criticizing current system for “strip[ping 
athletes] . . . of opportunities for their own self-determination and personal 
development” and calling for athletes to be treated “humanely and with 
dignity”); cf. Hruby, supra note 23 (contrasting athletes with those who 
have recognized legal rights, and describing athletes as “second-class 
citizens”). 
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particular needs, rather than face a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer 
of “one-size-fits-all” rules from a system that currently 
serves the NCAA’s interests.55 Athletes could describe what 
they want rather than having universities decide what they 
think the athletes should want,56 and in that sense, 
unionization counteracts paternalism and serves athletes’ 
autonomy as full human beings with dignity.
I have shared my view that the revenues diverted from 
athletes to coaches and stadium builders through university 
collusion properly belong to athletes. Others say that the 
money should not go back to the athletes, but should instead 
be used to fund the academic departments of universities to 
further the institutions’ educational mission.57 Some intend 
to accomplish this by convincing Congress to enact an 
antitrust exemption for the NCAA in exchange for the 
NCAA agreeing to certain conditions, including using this 
new antitrust exemption to cap coaches’ salaries.58 Under 
                                                             
55 See generally Schwarz, supra note 27, at 5 (describing wide-ranging types 
of benefits athletes might choose to bargain over). 
56 See CARE-FC, supra note 41, at 7 (noting that limitations on athletes’ 
voices “prevent . . . [them] from proposing salutary changes for the 
industry”). 
57 See, e.g., Zimbalist, Coaches’ Salaries, supra note 24; cf. Matthew Mitten & 
Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational 
Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 
837, 845, 847, 848 n.38, 849, 850, 867-68, 872-74 (2014) (not arguing that 
coaches’ salaries be used directly to finance academics but suggesting, 
instead, that all athletic department spending, including that for 
nonrevenue sports, be reduced, with meaningful amounts being diverted to 
academic uses in the university, including for teaching, research, and 
postgraduate programs). 
58 See College Athlete Protection (CAP) Act, draft dated June 10, 2014, 
available at https://drakegroupblog.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/college-
athlete-protection-act-6-10-14.pdf (containing proposal advanced by some 
Drake Group members); Brad Wolverton, Watchdog Group’s Proposal Calls 
for Antitrust Exemption for NCAA, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://chronicle.com/blogs/players/watchdog-groups-proposal-calls-for-
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other proposals, the NCAA would allow universities to 
terminate many nonrevenue sports and would significantly 
limit the number of football scholarships as cost-saving 
measures,59 and NCAA members would transfer these 
combined savings to academic departments in the university 
or to some “socially worthy causes” to be identified by a new 
“independent commission.”60
In my view, these approaches are just another way of taking 
value from athletes and, instead of giving it to coaches, 
stadium builders, and others in the athletic department, 
giving it to professors. While professors do socially valuable 
work, it is not the professors’ money either. Exploitation of 
athletes is not justified, in my view, by directing the money 
to some supposedly better cause.61
Why, might you ask, should the money generated in college 
sports be used to compensate athletes rather than be 
transferred to academic programs? 
First, many of the athletes need the money. Many are from 
impoverished families. Some already have families and 
children of their own. Some will have long-term injuries and 
health problems. Ninety-eight percent of these young men 
will not be able to “go pro.” As I have already stated, the 
time they played sports in college represents the four or five 
highest earning years in their sports careers and, in some 
                                                                                                                                        
antitrust-exemption-for-ncaa/33711; Zimbalist, Coaches’ Salaries, supra 
note 24 (suggesting savings from limiting coaches’ salaries could fund the 
academic side of the university).  
59 Mitten & Ross, supra note 57, at 872-73; Stephen F. Ross, Radical Reform 
of Intercollegiate Athletics: Antitrust and Public Policy Implications, 86 TUL. L. 
REV. 933, 933 (2012). 
60 Mitten & Ross, supra note 57, at 850, 867-68, 869, 873. 
61 Schwarz, supra note 31. 
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cases, in their entire lives.62
Second, keeping the money from players imposes costs on 
the public. Collusion by universities denies hard working 
young men fair compensation for their valuable skills. This 
shifts the burden to taxpayer-funded Pell grants and food 
stamps.63 About “40 to 45% of all FBS football athletes 
come from families with low enough means that they receive 
Pell grants. As one example, in 2006, 65% of UCLA’s 
[f]ootball [a]thletes received the[m].”64  “[Many] athletes 
[also] qualify for food stamps. If collusion among major 
colleges were ended, economic compensation would turn 
those Pell Grant [and food stamp] recipients into skilled 
earners.” 65 Even though the full scholarship cap has now 
been increased to the cost of attendance, NCAA rules do not 
require that additional pay,66 so there will still be many 
athletes who will qualify for these government aid programs.
Third, a large percentage of college football and men’s 
basketball players in Division I are African-American.67
Racial minorities, like any group, should not be deprived of 
their earnings or forced to forego those earnings in favor of 
white coaches, universities’ academic departments, or other 
“socially worthy causes.” As Nobel Prize winner and 
Presidential Medal of Freedom honoree, Gary Becker, once 
                                                             
62 See supra note 39. 
63 Schwarz, supra note 27, at 7. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See supra note 232. 
67 In 2014-15, 47.1% of football players and 58.3% of men’s basketball 
players on NCAA Division I teams were Black. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, Sport Sponsorship, Participation and Demographics Search 
[Data file], http://web1.ncaa.org/rgdSearch/exec/main (2015).  Including 
other racial minorities, the numbers go up to 59.7% for football and 74.8% 
for men’s basketball.  Id. 
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said: 
A large fraction of the Division I players in 
[men’s] basketball and football . . . are 
recruited from poor families; many of them are 
African-Americans from inner cities and rural 
areas. Every restriction on the size of 
scholarships that can be given to athletes in 
these sports usually takes money away from 
poor athletes and their families, and in effect 
transfers these resources to richer students in 
the form of lower tuition and cheaper tickets 
for games.68
Why should poor athletes, many of whom are African-
American, and their families be forced to finance the 
educational side of a university?
Fourth, perhaps most obviously, it is wrong to take the 
money from the athletes because, economically, it is their 
money. It comes from their efforts. They played the games. 
They put in the hours and provided the athletic services, day 
after day, month after month, all year around.69 They took 
the hits and got the injuries. Because it is their money, it 
should be their decision as to what to do with it. 
Athletes are experiencing “wage theft” as a result of 
collusion by their universities. The solution, in my view, is 
not to recoup the stolen wages from coaches and give them 
to some third party other than the athletes. The solution is for 
                                                             
68 Becker, supra note 27. 
69 See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the 
Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 97-
108 (2006) (detailing the arduous daily obligations of college football and 
men’s basketball athletes to their institutions). 
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athletes, themselves, to share in that value.70 Just like other 
human beings, athletes have the right to freely seek their
value within the marketplace. 
Underlying the argument that the money should go to 
academic programs is the notion that money is the source of 
corruption.71 The NCAA certainly wants people to believe 
that when athletes get money, it is corrupting.72 But there is 
nothing corrupt about “earning what you’re worth in the 
marketplace . . . [, and] there’s nothing wrong with 
universities realizing that they have . . . a very successful 
commercial product called college sports, and . . . 
commercializing it,”73 just like they do when they 
commercialize successful patents that make the world a 
better place.74
The fact is, we are not going to go back to the days when 
college sports was de-commercialized. That ship has sailed. 
College sports is too valuable. No one is going to walk away 
from that much money. And if we are not going to de-
commercialize, then the issue is how will the money be 
shared? Should the current beneficiaries be able to continue 
making all the rules and keep most of the money for 
themselves? Should the money be captured from the athletes 
                                                             
70 Accord Schwarz, supra note 29; Schwarz, supra note 27, at 2 (arguing 
against amateurism restrictions on athlete pay and advocating allowing the 
free market, or the acceptable proxy of collective bargaining, to operate to 
determine athletes’ compensation).  Concerns that some players would 
earn less under this system than their current scholarships are worth, and, 
therefore, that they would be worse off and unable to afford college, could 
be easily addressed by bargaining sets of uniform wage scales, including 
adopting a sufficient minimum salary, as is universally done in U.S. 
professional sports leagues through collective bargaining agreements.   
71 Schwarz, supra note 29. 
72 See BYERS, supra note 28, at 371. 
73 Schwarz, supra note 2931. 
74 Id. 
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and used for the university’s educational functions so we can 
hire more professors or pay them more? Or should the 
people who compete in the arenas and on the fields, who 
literally risk life and limb, who have worked so hard to 
provide arduous and valuable services, be allowed to share in 
the revenues they are primarily responsible for generating? 
Thank you for taking the time to be here. I will look forward 
to your questions. 
Matthew Morrow: Thank you much Professor McCormick. And 
now to wrap our panel on unionization from A to Z, Dr. Zimbalist.
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist.: Thank you. To quote a good friend of 
mine, Stefan Szymanski, “I feel a bit like an undertaker at a 
wedding.” Many of the . . . I had a formal Powerpoint 
presentation I was going to make, but many of the things I was 
going to say have already been said, so instead I think I am going 
to just make some comments. I agree with MOST of what has 
been said this afternoon or this morning. My concern is what the 
alternative world looks like that enables the further 
professionalization and commercialization of college sports. I 
think, in essence, when we analyze college sports today we have 
to acknowledge that it’s a hybrid system that has elements of 
commercialism and it has elements of amateurism in it. It is also 
apparent that those two forces are coming into acute contradiction 
and they’re increasingly unsustainable. And when we talk about 
reform, therefore, we have to talk about moving in one of two 
directions. One is toward greater commercialization and 
professionalization and the other is towards trying to roll it all 
back into an educational model. I'm frankly a little bit 
conflicted between the two but for the moment my
preference would be to try to roll it back into an educational
model. I'm concerned about what the professional model 
42
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss1/6
Fall] Pay for Play 221
 
would end up looking like. If we move along the lines that 
Amy was suggesting and introduce unionization and free 
markets into big time college sports. What do we do? Well, 
one question that needs to be addressed, for instance, is are
the athletes going to continue to be matriculated? Or are we 
going to move to a system where there's a Michigan State 
football team that plays a Spartan stadium, but the students 
are not matriculated? So in essence what it becomes is a 
minor league football team and same with basketball.
Are we going to end the charade that Bob McCormick talked
about where individuals who are not equipped to be 
students, and don't have the interest in being students, and 
don't have the time to be students. Are we going to continue 
with that charade and say, “OK. You're going to be now
paid basketball players or paid football players and you're
going to be students.” Or are we going to say no, we're
making a clean break and we have minor league football
now. We can call them the Michigan State Spartans if we
want, but they're not students. Maybe we give them a
voucher and we say to them, “Here. When you're done
playing for us, sometime in the future, maybe in two years
maybe in ten years, maybe in twenty years, if you want to be
students and you're equipped . . . you're qualified to be a 
student at Michigan State, here's a voucher you could come
back here for free. Here’s four years of free education.” I
think that's . . . It's a plausible way to go. I don't think it's, 
from my point of view, it's not the most desirable choice. 
With regard to unionization, I think that the athletes at
Northwestern have done a great service to college athletics
because they have pushed questions about exploitation and
necessary benefits and I think that they're going to be
43
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advancing. They've helped advance some of the reforms. The
reason . . . one of the reasons we have now a provision in 
the power five conferences to allow a cost of attendance 
stipend up to $5 thousand is because of what the 
Northwestern athletes or the football players have done. 
That's great but If we take it a step further and say let's move 
to a unionization model, let's do something where we can 
have a collective bargaining agreement where there are 
controls on labor costs so that we know what they're actually 
going to cost maybe we can get 45%, 47%, like in the NFL . 
. . players should get the same share as they do in the NFL. 
Well part of the problem there is that Northwestern, as has 
been said, is a private school and is subject to the NLRB. 
Public schools are not subject to the NLRB. Public schools 
are subject to the collective bargaining rights that are 
determined in each of the states. So I think that we have a
very messy and institutional environment that we would have 
to navigate.
I pity the poor athletes at the University of Wisconsin that are
dealing with Governor Walker. And many, many, states are 
“right to work” law states right now. So I think the mosaic that 
would emerge would make it very, very difficult to have some 
kind of a consistent pattern and consistent collective bargaining 
like we have in the individual sports. 
I think another issue is the brand. One of the reasons why 
college sports is as popular as it is today   is because it is 
branded as a college activity and that it's an amateur activity. 
Now I don't know exactly what would happen to its popularity 
if all of a sudden it became minor league sports or became 
fully professionalized, but I think it's a real issue. It's a real 
issue that has to be confronted. Another concern that I have is 
44
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss1/6
Fall] Pay for Play 223
 
what happens to Title IX. It's no secret that the successful 
football programs and successful male basketball programs 
funnel money to women's sports. In my view, what women's 
sports do in furthering the intellectual and emotional 
development and professional development of women athletes 
is wonderful and I think it's totally congruent with the 
conventional notions of what college sports is supposed to be 
about. 
So, if we are to move to professional model and separate out 
men's football and men's basketball, what happens to the 
surplus that has been financing women's sports and some of 
the Olympic sports for men? Still another issue, and Amy 
[McCormick] I think largely addressed this, I want to a few 
comments about it, another issue is the current financial 
situation in Division one or If we want to restrict ourselves to 
F.B.S. athletic programs. According to the last study that came 
out by Dan Fulks, who does the biannual studies on revenues 
and expenditures for the NCAA, in the fiscal year of 2014 the 
average operating loss for an F.B.S. athletic program was $20
million. Ten years earlier, the average loss was $5.4 million. 
So then average loss is growing at 14% per year. It’s likely to 
continue growing for a variety of reasons. One of those 
reasons is that college sports programs don't have 
stockholders. You don't have to show   a profit at the end of 
the quarter to make their stock go up. You do have 
stakeholders but there are no stockholders. 
Another thing, of course, that's happening, and Amy has 
pointed this out, when you're not allowed to pay the players 
explicitly, the people who recruit the players get the value, or 
a lot of the value, that the players produce. So coaches get 
these mammoth salaries many times higher than professional 
coaches salaries, because they're recruiting players who are 
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producing value and the players aren't getting paid. I think that 
one of the things that has to happen here is there needs to be a 
reform. We can do it through an antitrust exemption. You 
could do it through other mechanisms. But these coaches have 
a best alternative situation, or an opportunity cost, that would 
pay them a salary that is far, far below what they're currently
getting. Maybe they would get if they went to S.C.S. instead 
of F.B.S. or if they went to coaching in high school, maybe 
they get $50 thousand a year, maybe $100 thousand a year, 
and they're getting the average salary. . . . Bob told us the top, 
I think you said the top thirty five coaches or roughly that, is 
something like $3.6 million a year. The difference between the 
$3.6 million a year and the $100 thousand, or whatever the 
best alternative might be for an individual, that's called rent. 
Economists call that rent. That's a payment to a factor of 
production that’s unneeded to get that factor of production to 
allocate his or her services to that activity. If we had an 
antitrust exemption or a partial antitrust exemption, whether it 
were for the NCAA. or some alternative body that can control 
those coaches' salaries, we would be liberating large amounts 
of money. And if the head coaches salaries went down by a 
million or two million or three million dollars, the assistant 
coaches salaries would go down, and if they went down the 
athletic director salaries would go down, and the conference 
commissioner salaries would go down, and you'd be able to 
save a lot of money. Now there's an alternative of course that 
Amy was outlining which is pay the players and then the 
coaches won't get that revenue. That's part of the professional 
model that I think has some problems. Over time what would 
happen, it would not happen right away, but over time what 
would happen as coaches contracts expire, because some of 
them we know, like with Calipari, seven or eight year 
contracts . . . It wouldn't happen tomorrow that Calipari’s 
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salary went from $8 million down to, whatever, $300
thousand, it would happen over series of years. And not only 
that the contract stands in the way, but tradition stands in the
way. And momentum stands in the way. And other kinds of
expenditures that have happened in order to attract athletes
are things like, again Amy mentioned it, good training 
facilities, grandiose and luxurious stadiums. Those 
commitments, those financial commitments have been made
and they’re for twenty or thirty years. So you're not going to 
get, although the market will adjust if we start paying the 
players, it's not going to adjust immediately. And we're
going to have these athletic departments that are already 
running substantial deficits, running larger and larger 
deficits, which would be a drain on the university and a 
drain on the financing of other activities in college sports. 
So I would much prefer that we think about reform first as a 
set of measures to reduce the exploitation of college 
athletes. So, do things like introduce a cost of attendance
stipend. Do things like allow players to get licensing income 
or publicity rights income from the use of their names, 
images, and likenesses through a trust fund that they can
access after they graduate. Remove some of the restrictions 
about not being able to enter the draft or not being able to 
sign with an agent. Provide them with long term health 
insurance, not just the catastrophic the limited catastrophic 
insurance that currently exists. Provide them with insurance 
that would compensate them for disabling injury that robs 
them of lifetime income if they were going to become 
professional athletes. 
I think the unionization drive at Northwestern is something 
that's raising and pushing those interests. And it's wonderful 
for doing that, but to then assume that that's going to be our 
model and that's the way that we should be going for the 
47
Discussion: Pay for Play: Unionization and the Business of the NCAA
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
226 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16
 
future is something that's going to undermine the college 
sports that we've come to love in the United States, and it's 
going to increasingly threaten the financial viability of
college sports. Thank you very much.
Matthew Morrow: Thank you again to our panel for coming in 
today and giving us your time. We'd like start the question answer 
portion of the first panel now. I would like to open it up with a 
question Dr. Zimbalist talked on for a little bit there on the end to 
the rest of panel members. And that is what unionization would 
mean for college sports to the sports that are not the big money 
revenue generating sports, your basketball and football. How does 
unionization affect them and how do you think that should be 
factored in to the decisions that are being made?
Professor Robert McCormick: Well, let me just say there’s no 
question in my mind, or I think any of our minds, that athletes in 
nonrevenue-generating sports work very hard, and they sacrifice a 
lot. And they’re under the control of their coaches and athletic 
departments just like football and men’s basketball players are. 
The reason that Amy and I took the position we did, which was to 
limit employment status simply to athletes in the revenue 
generating sports of football men’s basketball, was because we 
could not in good faith reach the conclusion under the Brown
decision that the services of wrestlers or field hockey players 
created a primarily commercial relationship with the university. I 
don’t think that applies to them. They’re not bringing in money for 
the university. In fact, they’re costing the university money. So we 
didn’t feel that we could meet the Brown standard, that they have a 
primarily commercial relationship with the university, unlike 
football and men’s basketball players, who in our view, plainly 
have a commercial relationship, and not primarily an academic 
relationship, with the university.  So that’s why we took the 
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position that we took. Do we have sympathy for those young men 
and women in the nonrevenue-generating sports? Of course we do.
You know they work hard, they get injured, and they have many of 
the same life experiences as football and men’s basketball players, 
but the relationship between the athlete and the university is a very 
different relationship because the nonrevenue sports are not 
generating billions of dollars. So, just as a legal matter that’s why 
we took the position that we took. But, it’s a fair question. Should 
this status be extended also to these other young people? I guess I 
would leave that for somebody else to decide. But, for our 
purposes, I just wanted to explain the reason why we limited our 
theory to the scholarship players, not the walk-ons, and not athletes 
in the nonrevenue-generating sports. It was only these athletes, the 
scholarship players in football and men’s basketball, who fit the 
legal argument that we were making. 
Professor Amy McCormick: One concern that people have raised
is if you start paying football and men’s basketball players, doing 
so will take a subsidy away from the nonrevenue sports, and some 
of these sports will, as a consequence, essentially go out of 
business. 
I want to point out that the decision of whether to fund a 
nonrevenue sport is a decision about priorities in the university. If 
it is a priority to have lacrosse or field hockey or men’s diving, the 
university can decide to continue funding those activities. 
University budgets, as a whole dwarf Athletic Department 
budgets,75 so there is enough money in the university to fund 
                                                             
75 Andy Schwarz, My Reply to the House Committee on Education and the 
Workforce, 
http://sportsgeekonomics.tumblr.com/post/95972743323/my-reply-to-
the-house-committee-on-education-and (noting that “[w]ith a few 
exceptions, most schools’ athletic budgets account for 5% or less of the total 
institutional budget”).  
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nonrevenue sports if the university decides to prioritize them.
Many programs in a university lose money. I am referring to the 
Classics and English Departments, for example.76 But although 
those programs lose money, if they are prioritized, they get funded. 
So the question is, is this nonrevenue sport a priority? Are people 
willing to pay for the nonrevenue sport even though it does not
generate funds? Are they willing to pay for it if it loses the subsidy 
it is currently receiving from football or men’s basketball? If we
are not willing to prioritize a certain sport, so that it closes down 
without the subsidy, if we are not willing to prioritize it because 
we think it falls at the end of the line, behind all the other programs 
in the university, if we are not willing to pay for it ourselves, then
why should we force football players and men’s basketball players
to pay for that nonrevenue sport?77 That is precisely what that 
cross-subsidy does. It forces football and men’s basketball players 
to pay for an activity78 that we have already decided we are not 
willing to pay for because we do not value it enough to prioritize it. 
I do not think it is appropriate to force another group of people to 
pay for an activity that we do not value enough to pay for 
ourselves.
Another way of saying this is that it’s a fallacy to assume that the 
nonrevenue sports are necessarily funded by surpluses from 
football and men’s basketball – surpluses that exist because of 
collusion capping those players’ compensation. Nonrevenue sports 
are funded by money from the university.  Full stop.  Whether that 
money is viewed as coming from football and men’s basketball 
surpluses, or from coaches’ salaries, or from the athletic director’s 
salary, or even from grants obtained by researchers or students’ 
                                                             
76 See Schwarz, supra note 31, at 53. 
77 Id. at 57. 
78 See Zimbalist, Frontline, supra note 24. 
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tuition dollars, depends only on your point of view.  Money the 
university spends on nonrevenue sports is simply money the 
university has – from whatever source – which it decides to spend 
this way.  Blaming fairer compensation of football or men’s 
basketball players for the potential loss of a nonrevenue sport is 
blaming only one potential cause of the problem.  Why aren’t we 
blaming the high pay of football or men’s basketball coaches, or of 
athletic directors?  Why aren’t we blaming researchers, or trustees 
who set tuition, for the potential loss of a nonrevenue sport?  It’s 
illogical to put the onus of nonrevenue sports funding solely on the 
backs of 18- to 22-year-old athletes who had nothing to do with 
setting up the system we have now. 
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: Can I share?
Matthew Morrow: Sure.
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: I’ll chime in on that. I think that if we 
fairly look at the revenue generators on an F.B.S. football team. 
And the average F.B.S. football team, as you know is, 85% are 
scholarship athletes and has 35 walk ons. If we fairly look at the 
value of the output of those players what we would find is that 
there are a handful of players that have, very, very, high 
productivity. And then there's another group of players that have 
some reasonable level of productivity and then we have the masses 
of those 120 players who are getting. Well it's eighty five players 
for scholarship, they're getting a scholarship that might be worth 
thirty or fifty or Northwestern I think they say sixty one thousand 
dollars a year. Whose actual marginal revenue product or the value 
of what they produce is below the scholarship that they get. I'm 
very concerned about those superstars in college who might be 
generating three or four, five million dollars worth of value and 
they getting a scholarship that for them might be worth forty or 
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fifty thousand dollars give or take. There's exploitation going on 
there and has been has been pointed out more often than not. Those 
people are minority. They come from minority groups, which 
makes it even more concerning, particularly tense, to cross subsidy 
a subsidy that's going to white male tennis players from the upper 
middle class or golfers or some of the women sports that that we 
were talking about briefly before. It seems to me that one way to 
deal with that is to make sure that these superstars who in the year 
or two or three, if it's basketball's usually in one year, are about to 
become very well paid millionaires in the NBA To make sure that 
that those individuals are taking care of in case they get injured. 
That they have injury disability insurance so that if their 
professional career is shortened or aborted by a college injury that 
they get some large share of the income that they would otherwise 
have gotten in the professional ranks. In terms of the cross 
subsidies more generally, look I think that fundamentally we have 
to decide what it is that happens at college and what is what is the 
environment in the culture that we want to rule in a college. We 
don't pay the first violinist in our school orchestras. We don't pay 
the tuba player in the marching band. We don't pay thespians in 
college plays. We don't, I don't, I know Smith College doesn't, we 
don't use the market system to allocate resources once somebody is 
in the door. I don't take bids if I have too many people signing up 
for my sports economics class. I don't take competitive bids to see 
who gets in my class. Everybody has an equal chance in terms of 
money resources, obviously there are qualifications, prerequisites, 
and stuff, but do we want to have the dollar in the marketplace 
invade the social relations and the priorities that exist within the 
university. I do think that with women's sports and the non-revenue 
men sports, one of the ways we can save money is and that would 
help allow us to provide much better benefits for the highly 
productive athletes is to stop giving scholarships to people who 
play on the lacrosse team that doesn't generate any money. Stop 
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giving scholarships to people who are on the swimming team that 
doesn't generate any money. Why should they get athletic 
scholarships? So lots of things can change. But, again I start with 
the premise that before we move for a professional model and 
throw everything out the window that we should see if we can 
make the educational model work. 
Matthew Morrow: Great thank you. I would like to throw it out to 
the room now and at this point answer any questions form the 
audience.
Scott Harris: Hello, my name is Scott Harris. I am the Vice 
President of white-collar sports nation. We train high school 
student athletes on how to pursue sports business careers.  We just 
happen to do a review this month that touches on some of the 
things that the McCormicks were talking about. We found a study 
in the May 2013 of Pittsburgh Post Gazette. It says that the 
University of Pittsburgh, Pen State University, and the top 25 
college basketball and football programs. Out of those programs all 
the athletes major in five specific disciplines: business, 
communications, interdisciplinary studies, fitness studies, and 
sociology. Obviously, that's not going to help them when they 
graduate. So they asked the President of the NCAA about this, 
Mark Emmert. I think it was about a year ago he did a conference 
call and they gave him these numbers. He says the NCAA can do 
nothing to ensure athletes will receive a credible education and can 
only promote overall goals. And then he said whether or not an 
individual schools providing the kind of quality education for 
athletes or the rigor you need to be a successful graduate has to be 
something the university itself pays attention to. So I just wanted 
you all to comment on that.
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: We can’t criticize Mark Emmert. 
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Professor Robert McCormick: Heaven forbid. 
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: No look, again, I think that for a large 
majority of the football players and male basketball players in 
F.B.S. schools they're being asked to live a lie and we're not doing 
them a favor by giving them one route to the pros, which is to go to 
college. And so that should be stopped and whatever reform 
happens to the NCAA itself for college sports itself. I think that 
there ought to be minor leagues available for these players now 
that the NBA has made a move in that direction. Obviously, Major 
League Baseball has that hockey has had some options available. 
Ah, football doesn't really have direct options, but that seems to me 
that both the NBA and the NFL are getting tremendously 
subsidized by college sports. And it's time for them to start training 
and developing their own players or at least some of their own 
players, so that we don't force these high school athletes to go into 
a situation that makes them live a lie. 
Professor Robert McCormick: Can I just add very briefly,
because there are lots of other questions, that I think in some ways 
the American academy has behaved in a pretty shameful way. 
Many of you know their argument is, “Hey they’re getting a free 
college education. That’s a good deal. A lot of people would like a 
free college education!” But are they really getting an education?
Is it possible for a student to get an education while playing 
football and lifting weights and running for forty, fifty, hours a 
week? You are not really getting a real education. This is not 
really possible. Universities—these great virtuous institutions—
are engaging in this fraud, pretending that this is an amateur 
activity and that these athletes are getting quality educations at 
quality institutions. This is something Emmert always emphasizes. 
And it’s just not true. It’s just not true for the vast majority of 
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them. And to me that’s something that the American academy 
should be hanging its head about.
John G. Adam: Let me just say one comment about the free ride 
because that came up in the testimony at the hearing. We asked 
Kain about that. Kain, you know, they say you get a free ride and 
he says there's nothing free about what he did. Those guys devote 
enormous hours, enormous commitment, to it. It's not a free ride, 
its compensation. And from my viewpoint, from the viewpoint of 
the NLRB case. That's what we were focusing on. As opposed to 
some of these some of these other issues about models and what 
you actually do with it. But there's nothing free about what they do 
they earn it and they get compensated for it. And I think that came 
through. And it came through in the testimony too, if you just read 
about what these guys do on a day to day basis. And where you 
draw the line people always say where do you draw the line what 
about these other programs. That's what lawyers always argue to. 
That's why you ask the question where do you draw the line. Well 
actually that's what litigation helps determine. And there's always 
the beginning in litigation and we can't predict exactly what will 
happen. That's why if the NCAA and universities don't fix the 
problems, it ends up in the legal system right that's what happens if 
the legislative bodies don't respond—people go to the courts, the 
board or other agencies, and the board, yes, it can be messy. Where 
do you draw the line? Well, the McCormick's have articulated the 
commercial enterprise nature of these sports. That's one way to 
draw the line. Look, Taylor Branch and Dr. Zimbalist and others 
aren't talking about the exploitation of the tuba players or the 
violinist or the marching band members. It's a different 
relationship. Football and basketball that level is a commercial 
enterprise. And I think we delude. We deny reality. So where do
you draw the line? That may be where you draw the line. Where it 
will come down, I don't know, but that's what happens when you 
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litigate instead of legislate to fix the problems. And so, if it's messy 
maybe it will be messy. But, collective bargaining can be messy 
and what the model will be will take brains like Dr. Zimbalist and 
the McCormicks and others to figure through. What we're trying to 
do in Northwestern is to raise these issues. And let's get legal 
rulings on it and if we need to resolve it through some other means 
that's what we do. 
Matthew Morrow: Great. Thank you, next question.
Audience Member: Some of you may be aware that when arena 
football players started to talk about their grievances clearly 
employs professional sport. And they were persuaded that a free 
market would work best for them or might well work best for
them. The Arena Football League locked them out and demanding 
that they form a union to collectively bargain. The NLRB then 
found that that was an unfair labor practice to then force them to be 
a union if they didn't want to. But, then they did negotiate a
collective bargaining agreement that was satisfactory to both sides. 
So I wanted to preface my question with that sort of legal 
observation. We've heard from Mr. Adam why college football 
players are employees under the National Labor Relations Act. 
And we've heard the CAPA model is to only negotiate with 
Northwestern about things that Northwestern can do within NCAA 
rules. That's the CAPA statement. I presume although I welcome 
Mr. Adam’s comment, that that would be bargaining in good faith 
for Northwestern to say sorry we're not leaving the NCAA so we're 
not going to agree to anything that will put us outside of the 
NCAA, and, we can talk about it all you want, but we're never 
going to grant that so let's talk about these other demands. We've 
heard from Amy McCormick that NCAA policies are set by a 
bunch of officials, athlete directors, professors who are basically 
self-interested carteliers conspiring to enrich themselves. That's 
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what they're about. So my question, if we put these two things 
together to Mr. Adams is if the college officials are as Amy 
McCormick has portrayed them. Why wouldn't they just say Amy 
McCormick is right here’s what we are going to do, you win 
Adam, we're going to recognize unions everywhere and at the 
beginning of spring practice we're just announcing we're locking 
everybody out. We're going to recognize all unions because you 
want to be a union now that's not in the football league case. We're 
going to lock everybody out. And you are not playing sports you 
are not showing yourself for the pros. Your valuable time is 
wasting away until you sign a collective bargaining agreement that 
is basically. And, here is the NCAA bylaws. 
John G. Adam: While you got a lot in that question.
Audience Member: If they are the profit making carteliers that 
Amy McCormick described then isn’t that the strategy that they 
should be pursuing? Why in your judgment won't it work?
John G. Adam: I don't want to speculate on. There's a lot of 
speculation that I would have to do even to try to answer that 
question. It seems unlikely that what you suggested is going to 
happen, even by any stretch under the current situation. So what, 
all we’re trying to do in the Northwestern case is established the 
legal principle. And what happens from it. How bargaining takes 
place what happens. That will have to be decided when confronted 
with those things. I do you know, the idea that if the NCAA says 
we want to recognize CAPA for all university football players. Is 
that we are suggesting they're going to do?
Audience Member: Well I'm not a labor lawyer and I've never 
done a single labor relations bargaining. I’m asking you as a labor 
lawyer who has some experience in this area, why you think that 
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wouldn't be a smart strategy. And why it wouldn’t be an effective
strategy for NCAA officials. If we assume that they're going to 
lose the point on employees, they’ve already given up on the tax, 
social security, workers comp, OSHA, and all the other things that 
come with being labeled employee. So they know they've lost that 
because you're messing litigation and now these guys are legally 
employees you won that principle. Why isn't a smart and effective 
move for them to just lockout the players and slam them down 
with a grossly unfair collective bargaining. 
Professor Robert McCormick: Steve, your question assumes that 
there’s one union for the players. And all we’re talking about here, 
all John’s talking about is one union at one school. If you had one 
union and if the NCAA, rather than the college, was the respondent
to the union, then your hypothetical would, I think have some 
application.
John G. Adam: The premise of your question is really based on 
some flawed premises. But, lets just answer the generic question. If 
the NCAA came to CAPA or to some union and said we want to 
grant recognition to you as a bargaining representative. I think we 
would look at that as a good thing. I just doubt that, that is just not 
going to happen in the real world.  Ultimately, the reason, and Dr. 
Zimbalist and others can testify, the reason, in professional sports 
anyways, you have a multi-player employer league. And they 
basically are exempt from the anti-trust that's why employers 
normally they can’t conspire to fix prices, antitrust. But, if it's 
through collective bargaining agreement, employers can get 
together, negotiate, fix prices, wages. And that's going to be 
considered exempt and that's what they do in professional sports 
and that's what they do in other things. Is that model going to apply 
here? Potentially, there are issues of state and federal law. So you 
know it would be a good strategy would I welcome the NCAA
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deciding to grant recognition if they could. I think that would be 
great strategy, but the idea that the any university, Northwestern or 
elsewhere is going to simply shut down these football programs 
because of the unionization effort, its just not going to happen. 
There's too much money to be made, far too much money.
Professor Robert McCormick: Can I just add something? If that 
were to be the case, and I agree it is highly unlikely that it would 
be the case, that would be a way in which the NCAA and this 
union, as John was just alluding to, could negotiate a uniform wage 
scale like the UAW does. And that then might be the way the 
NCAA could actually have these anti-competitive arrangements 
and preserve them through the non-statutory labor exemption. But 
they would be doing so in a way that would actually protect the 
players’ interests for a change, so, in that case, it might be a good 
idea. 
Audience Member: [inaudible clarifying point].
Professor McCormick: Well whatever you know, well whatever 
they agree to, some wouldn't. That's what collective bargaining 
does. 
John G. Adam: And yet, CAPA’s position has been we’re not 
advocating that these players be pay particular in the context of the 
Northwest. There are other ways to compensate the players. 
There's been allusion to the rights of their publicity, the right to 
certain revenues, additional tuition, additional stipend those are 
ways to do it. So there's a model that doesn't require the idea that 
everyone's going to get paid a salary. So I think there's a way to do 
it. 
Matthew Morrow: Great, at the table right up front here.
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Audience Member: This question is more for you. In your 
analysis, did you just look at full scholarship players or were half 
scholarship or three quarter scholarship players included in your 
analysis of what is an employee. 
John G. Adam: They were all full scholarship players at 
Northwestern. That wasn't even an issue.
Audience Member: Oh I see, but how would you treat people who 
don't receive full scholarship, like whether they are employees or 
not. And then what would we do with walk on players, would they 
be apart of the union even though they're not being compensated 
by a scholarship.
John G. Adam: Yeah, walk-on is also is another term used for the 
non-scholarship, so they're not getting scholarship. We filed a 
petition only with respect to players that are receiving the 
scholarship compensation. And we did it because the in 
McCormick's have made reference to that, it shows that they're 
clearly compensated for their services. The walk ons you call the 
non-scholarship as you call it, they're obviously not receiving 
compensation. They're not receiving specific scholarships. We 
took the position that we would welcome them within the 
bargaining unit. That they have all the attributes of employment, 
but obviously they don't have the compensation portion of it. 
We took the position we could include them or they can be 
excluded. Our petition was based upon only the scholarships. Don't 
forget the walk ons also potentially can get scholarships it's not 
uncommon. So there's an argument to give made that they could be 
included in it. But, applying the NLRB standards you do run into 
these issues where it's not the normal employment relationship. 
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And it's not the normal employment relationships because the 
entire infrastructure of collegiate sports has been built on what we 
call the student athlete myth. All right. So, our positions were to 
limit it to the scholarship athletes, and that’s what the regional 
director ruled in this case.
Matthew Morrow: All right, down the middle right here.
Audience Member: So I'm not a lawyer but I found the 
arguments about why these are ways incredibly persuasive 
so you have my vote
John G. Adam: Thank you no further questions. (Audience 
Laughter). No go ahead.
Audience Member: Actually I would like to invite you to 
speculate a bit more, which is to say well okay and this is
what I have read is that if in fact the NLRB did recognize
them as a union and they were treated as employees then it’s
conceivable that Congress might step in and pass some kind 
of law which says no you are student athletes no you are not 
employees or whatever. So whether that is possible or not I 
don't know you have an opinion on that but also I would like 
to know what you think the constitutionality of that, would 
that be challengeable or would, could congress really do that 
and get away with it.
John G. Adam: The National Labor Relations Act was passed by 
Congress in 1935 and has been amended. Congress can 
change it. Congress has changed it over the decades. We all 
know what they're called, what are they called when they 
change the law. When Congress changes the law it, amends 
it. Okay you can even amend the Constitution. So if the 
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National Labor Relations Board rules that they are 
employees. Then it would be within the purgative of
Congress to amend the National Labor Relations Board Act to
say, so-called students performing athletic services are not 
employees within the National Labor Relations Act. If the 
majority of Congress passed it and the president signed it, 
then yes it would effectively override the NLRB decision. 
And it does happen where Congress will override an 
agency's determination of the law, so that is a possibility. In 
the state of Michigan, the governor and the legislature in
December, amended exactly what they did, exactly what
you're talking about, they amended the state National Labor 
Relations Act so speak the mini version of it that applies to
public employees to exclude quote so-called student athletes
from rights under the Public Employer Relations Act in
Michigan. Effectively meaning that collegiate athletes at LSU 
or U of M could not organize. By definition they are excluded
from the protections of the Act. And these laws, you know,
Congress and the state legislature can decide how the law and
whether certain laws will extend a certain groups. Whether 
extends to medical professionals will extend to executives
they can decide that. And that's what the Michigan legislature
did and the governor signed with actually no hearings, 
without any petition being filed in Michigan. And it was
ironically I think signed by Governor Snyder the same day
that Jim Harbaugh was given a $45 million long-term 
contract. Which by the way many of these contracts that we 
hear about salary, they don't, you don't even hear about the
other benefits. The low interest free loans that college coaches 
get, camps, the amount of money they make with TV revenue, 
apparel. The coaches will require the players sometimes at 
some universities, you know, to appear on the radio station
with a coach who has a programming. But Congress, yes,
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could do it and some members, the Republican members, of 
Congress have actually threatened or suggested they would 
do that. If they did it, would it be challenged under the 
Constitution, I'll leave that to some constitutional law
professor. But generally you know, Congress can control how 
the labor relations laws will be governed, unless somehow it 
effects some type of constitutional right. 
Professor Amy McCormick: I just want to jump in. In
2014, the NCAA tripled the amount it was spending on
lobbying in Congress compared to the prior year.79 So, yes, I
do think the NCAA is trying to influence legislation. It is 
facing a lot of pressure. The NCAA would love to get an
antitrust exemption and make O’Bannon and Jenkins and all
the other antitrust cases go away. It would love to get an 
amendment to the NLRA to say that college athletes are not
employees. So, yes, I am quite sure that NCAA leaders are 
considering all of their legislative options.
John G. Adam: And I want to mention that the antitrust litigation 
is very important in this thing. You know, while I'm 
involved in Northwestern case and I think we've helped 
make progress. The antitrust litigation is what could blow up 
the whole NCAA system. Because if the NCAA system is 
broken up. That will open up a lot of other things. And so the 
antitrust litigation is really very direct challenge to the
structure of the NCAA. And I want to ask you how many of 
you even know how the NCAA came about, how it was 
created? Does anyone know?
                                                             
79 See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Drastically Increases Its Spending on Lobbying, 
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Audience Member: Didn’t they trick Kentucky into 
accepting some sort of sanction and then sometime in the 
50s they convinced Kentucky . . . 
John G. Adam: No, no, no. 1903, because college football 
players,1906 whenever it was . . .
Dr. Zimbalist: December 5. [laughter]. 
Professor Amy McCormick: Teddy Roosevelt. [laughter].
Professor Robert McCormick: A century ago. [laughter]. 
John G. Adam: College football players were actually 
dying in large numbers.
Professor Amy McCormick: Literally. 
John G. Adam: I don’t know twenty or thirty a year in
collegiate sports back in the turn of the century and Teddy
Roosevelt decided to bring together the heads of these
universities predominantly a lot of them were Ivy League. You
know back then, the eastern, bring them together and say
these players are getting killed. Dying in large numbers.
Literally being maimed. So the NCAA was created. The 
original purpose was to protect the, ah . . . 
Professor Amy McCormick: Their health and safety. 
John G. Adam: Yeah, the health and safety. But you know 
a lot of organizations start with a certain purpose and then
evolve over time. [laughter]. And that's what's happened to 
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the NCAA, it's evolved over time. I mean look the 
universities don't really like the NCAA, the coaches don't
like the NCAA, the players don't like the NCAA. No one
really likes it. But it does allow for this cartel to be 
maintained and it does give cover to the universities. So 
while the universities don't like it. It does allow them to 
maintain this system in place. And so that's where I think the 
ultimate significant change will come as to the antitrust and 
Jeff Kessler is leading one of the antitrust lawyers, is also
representing the NFL players unions and is representing Tom
Brady and others. That case is challenging the cap on what we
call compensation. That, if I was the NCAA, I don't think
they are worried about me, I would worry about Jeff Kessler
and the others in the antitrust. That could make a big 
difference, because if they say to the NCAA. you can't limit 
the cap, you can't cap it to scholarships. Then what would it 
do Dr. Zimbalist that would, wouldn’t that be significant. 
Professor Amy McCormick: Then the NCAA would want 
a union.
John G. Adam: They would want a union. They’d come to 
me and say we want a union.
Professor Robert McCormick: They would, they would 
just like the NFL.
Audience Member: Yes, I had a question actually about Dr. 
Zimbalist distinction between the public and private sort of 
problem.  So, it seems that at the seventeen private schools, 
there's a possible unionization route, which seems kind of like 
a distinction without a difference considering that the
universities that are all over that are public have the exact 
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same student athlete issue and the thing that kind of stands
out is that the NCAA, which all of you have alluded to is
controlling the same things at both universities. So I guess 
the question is how feasible is it to prove employee status 
against the NCAA because then possibly you could unionize 
there.
John G. Adam: That is a good question. Well, you're asking
is goes to the legal concept of joint employer. Where you 
have two entities that basically control terms and conditions
of employment. And I'm not, I don't want to speculate on this
too much but if you have a situation where you have an 
entity where employers are part of it and that helps to set the 
terms and conditions of employment. Then the larger entity,
that is helping set the terms and conditions, is viewed as a 
joint employer. So some have suggested that the NCAA and 
the universities are in fact our joint employers. And therefore 
the employment status should extend to the university and to 
the NCAA But our position, when we filed it at 
Northwestern we focused on Northwestern to make our case
because it's never been done before,you've got to make the
case, you've got to work your legal strategy. And the strategy
was Northwestern, it makes it a simple straightforward 
proposition. And part of what you do when you advocate for
changes you have to educate the public. Because the public is
inundated with the things the McCormicks have talked about, 
student athletes, student athletes, when you drove by here it 
is called the student athlete building, okay. Many members 
of the public don't understand this, like what are you talking 
about how can they be. So part of what you do through
litigation is also you're educating the public. And now for the 
first time well maybe not the first time, but people now are 
talking about the issue in a much more concrete fashion and 
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they understand it. They may not agree with unionization, 
they may think it's not the way to go. But now they
understand maybe a little bit better what's happening. And
that you know, even members of Congress, the Republican
members, have said look you know I don't like what's going 
on but you've got to fix this. This is a problem. We all know 
it. If you don't fix it somebody else is going to do it.
Matthew Morrow: Anyone else? 
Audience Member: All of the professors kind of touched on 
this, but to me, the big kind of problem in college sports is 
the pull between amateurism and professionalism.  
Amateurism being mentioned in the NCAA manual like 
upwards of 200 times. And a lot of this we can focus on 
basketball now, coming more to a head with teams like 
Kentucky and Duke being just one and done factories 
churning out these professional players. How much would it 
solve that problem, it could kind of work for football as well, 
if there is some sort of requirement for attendance of college so
that these athletes aren’t just there one year, receiving no
value, no utility from their time at the university. But rather 
requiring that athletes at least try or attempt to attain a 
degree. And those who are just going to use it as a stepping-
stone to the pros not necessarily be bared from going, but 
there be some sort of contractual obligation from the student 
that they stay and perform as a student while they are at the 
university acting as an athlete. Is that you know a solution or 
is that something that is maybe not feasible.
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: So I think one of the things that you
have to confront is that the college teams even as successful
as they are still way below the revenue levels in professional
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sports. The top thirty basketball teams in Division one, I think 
they have the median revenue of about $15 million as 
opposed to $180 million which is the average revenue in the 
NBA and the top thirty two football teams and F.B.S. are 
about $50 million, in the NFL it's $300 million. So even if 
we can transition to a professionalized relatively free labor 
market in college sports where athletes are paid. They are
still going to be paid a lot less in college and remember also
that today's college sports have a variety of tax preferences 
that might go out the window and that could hurt them even
more. But the other constraint is that in the collective
bargaining agreements in the NBA in the NFL They have
stipulations about when players can go from college. In the
NFL you have to be three years out of high school in the NBA
it's currently one year out of high school that's created the 
one and done phenomenon. So there would be constraints on 
both ends that would prevent what I think you're suggesting
could be a salutary development. That is to say to the student 
athletes or college athletes would stay in school longer and 
minimize the problem of the one and done.
John G. Adam: I was going to mention, somebody
mentioned the concept amateurism and one of the 
Northwestern officials to testify was the director of NCAA
compliance. The level of employment in the athletic 
department actually staggering, the amount of people that are 
there to regulate this and I just took him through the NCAA
book and said look let's talk about amateurism. It's okay if
they get a watch if they go to a bowl game as long as it’s less 
than $500. That's right so that doesn't, that's still amateurism. 
If it's $499, that's right, but if it's $501 well, then it's not 
amateurism. So your definition of amateurism is whatever you
want to make it isn't it. Well, whatever we define it is, that's 
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what it is okay. I don't view them as amateurs because I view 
the scholarships as significant compensation. And I don't want 
to get too far afield and the others may know more about this 
but for a long time there was the belief that Olympic athletes 
must remain amateurs. That it will destroy the Olympic 
athletes, right. They have to be pure amateurs. And what 
happened is a lot of the athletes had to give up their collegiate 
careers. They couldn't continue competing if they wanted to 
draw a revenue. Mark Spitz has to, when he wins his gold 
medals he has to stop competing and he sells commercials. 
That's all changed now. Those athletes for the most part don't 
receive salaries do they?
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: When in the Olympics?
John G. Adam: Yeah
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: Sure they do.
John G. Adam: Well they get endorsements. 
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: But they get salaries from they 
international federations also.
John G. Adam: From the federation, but they also get 
endorsements is where they can make money. So I don't know 
that anyone's arguing that the Olympic athletes that are not
receiving compensations of different, that's hurt them. In fact 
it has prolonged the careers now, it seems to me. But again 
amateurism is all how you define it. And the NCAA defines 
ours a certain way and it defines amateurs in a certain way.
So I just don't, would not hold much value as to how they
define it.
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Matt Morrow: In the back.
Audience Member: Lately the sports world has been focused 
a lot on the former Wisconsin football player and San 
Francisco NFL player Chris Borland. And with Chris Borland 
his issue is the head injuries and he retired early. Now I believe 
that it was you Mr. Zimbalist who suggested potentially 
insurance for players, potentially who get injured and 
potentially looking further past, for their future earning power. 
How does the aspect of one being able to determine a head 
injury and the potential earning power and also seeing how 
much a player can progress into being profitable, or making 
their career profitable in professional sports? How do you 
assess that or how do you see that being assessed in the future?
Dr. Andrew Zimbalist: I'm not sure I understand what, let
me take a crack at it, I don’t know if I’ll be answering your
question or not but I think the way that insurance companies 
would approach that is by using probabilities and that you'd 
have to project somebody based upon their college career. 
What they would likely earn in the pros and how long they 
would likely be in the pros. I don't think they could 
anticipate somebody deciding after one year that they didn't 
want to subject themselves to the risk of injury though. You 
know currently my understanding is and somebody can 
correct me. The law, the NCAA introduced long-term 
disability insurance for college athletes, somewhere around
ten years ago. And my understanding is that in order to qualify
to get that as an athlete you have to have said, you have to
show symptoms at the time that you leave college or while 
you're still playing in college. So a lot of the brain trauma 
injuries that we're reading about, that we're seeing litigations 
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over are cases where people don't show obvious symptoms 
for many, many, years after they graduate. And hence this 
injury, which we now know, is probably the most common 
and disabling injury from playing football is not covered by
the NCAA insurance. 
John G. Adam: And that is one of the things that drove Kain
Colter and the Northwestern drive is to expand and mandate 
medical insurance and long-term medical insurance for 
certain injuries. Because Northwestern does a decent job at it 
but a lot of it is not required and a lot of it has loopholes. And
that's an area where you can definitely bargain and try to seek
improvement. And it reminds me that Ramogi Huma of the
head of N.C.P.A. I think it was on Stephen Colbert and he 
said you know what we used to think that head injuries, head 
traumas was going to be the end of football but now it’s 
going to be unionization. So the head injury thing is a serious
problem. Especially in football it's the most brutal of sports,
and most demanding and something has to be done about it 
either through collective bargaining or through some other
means.
Matthew Morrow: All right time for one more question.
Audience Member: So kind of what you guys have been 
mentioning is more of I guess an individual union per school 
and I kind of wonder how that will go across for I’ll say the 
outlier sports, the non traditional revenue generating sports. 
And I’m thinking of like UCON’s women’s basketball or the 
University of Virginia baseball, which are popular sports at 
those schools and how those athletes could potentially utilize 
the unionization. And then how that could potentially affect 
competitive balance within the different schools and those 
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sports and affect those schools.
John G. Adam: Well so far our focus has been obviously the 
Northwestern case and division one collegiate football and 
basketball. Whether it expands beyond that really is
speculation and depends on lots of different developments.
But again it goes to the slippery slope issue where do you
draw the line and is the line drawn with commercial revenue
or not and I just want to win at the NLRB right now. And I 
want Jeff Kessler and others to have some victories and 
others will be sorted through the courts or the board or the 
legislative bodies will have to try to fix the problem. 
Matthew Morrow: All right, well great. I'd like to give a 
thank you to the panel for coming here today and sharing 
with us. That will conclude the panel for the first half of the 
day. Lunch will be provided shortly, and I hope that 
everyone can stick around for the second panel starting 
around noon, which should be coming back together then. 
Thank you.
Panel 2: Antitrust Cases Involving the NCAA
Paige Szymanski: Good afternoon. I hope that everyone 
enjoyed their lunch. My name is Paige Szymanski and I am 
the journal’s incoming Managing Editor of Articles for 
volume sixteen. And I'll be serving as the moderator for this 
panel. This afternoon’s panel will examine the current 
antitrust cases involving the NCAA. Before we begin. I'd 
like to briefly introduce the panelists for our discussion 
their full back with biographies will also be in your
programs.
72
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss1/6
Fall] Pay for Play 251
 
Dr. Rodney Fort is a professor of sport management at the 
University of Michigan. He is recognized internationally as 
an authority and speaker on sports economics and business. 
His many publications cover sports topics as diverse as 
sports itself. Dr. Fort serves on the Journal Editorial Board
and serves as Vice President for the International
Association of Sports Economists. He has testified before 
the U.S. Subcommittee on Antitrust concerning competitive
balance issues in baseball.
Professor Stephen Ross is a professor of law at the Dickinson 
School of Law at Penn State University. He teaches and
writes in the areas of sports law and comparative 
constitutional law. He has provided expert testimony and 
advice on sports antitrust issues to governmental entities in
both the United States and Canada. He has served as pro bono
counsel to the American Antitrust Institute and consumer 
groups on antitrust and sports litigation. 
Dr. Richard Southall is tenured associate professor at the 
University of South Carolina in the department of Sport
Entertainment Management. His research focuses critically
on examining the NCAA collegiate model of athletics, and
he's a recognized expert on big time college sport issues. Dr. 
Southall has been a consultant for plaintiffs in the ongoing 
O'Bannon versus NCAA litigation. And in 2014 was invited 
to testify before the U.S. Senate subcommittee on
Commerce Science and Transportation during a committee
hearing on safety and well-being of college athletes. 
Dr. Ellen Staurowsky is a full-time professor at the in the 
Department of Sport Management at Drexel University. She 
is internationally recognized as an expert on social justice
issues in sports. She was also an expert witness in the historic
O'Bannon versus NCAA case. Dr. Staurowsky is an athlete's
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rights researcher and has co-authored several studies with 
the National College Players Association. Each panelist will 
have twenty minutes for the presentation. And we will start
with Professor Fort.
Dr. Rodney Fort: Hi. It’s interesting how the tides have
turned, right? I mean three lawyers, one economist. Not so 
much. Audience laughter.
One of the earlier panelists talked about “basics” and sports
especially at the college level.  It requires I think some basic
truth and we need to start maybe three steps back. From
seeing exactly what's going on in the minutia of the actual 
administration of college sports and kind of wonder more 
about the organizational structure of college sports and 
what that means for policy. So that's what I want to talk
about today. It's always a matter of basics. So here you go.
Which one's better? Clearly the B.C.S. would have given us
’Bama versus F.S.U. The College Football Playoff gave us
Ohio State versus Oregon. Which one is better? I suspect
that there would be a difference of opinion in the room. And
that's all because it depends on the choice of the playoff 
basics, doesn't it? And so instead of arguing about what the
B.C.S. ranking system did, now we argue about what the
C.F.P. selection committee did. And we're just as unhappy
being the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth team as we used to
be. I have a book that's full of these sorts of wonderings 
about myths and things like that so you want to go see 
Chapter 7 on this.
I think this is just as essential an observation about 
assessing college sports policy. So I want to get way back to
basics. This might be like kindergarten basics. And that's the
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first thing, to sort of figure out what exactly does the 
structure look like. What is it doing? How does it work?
And here's a model.
Caveat, since I'm in a room full of lawyers. I'm not sure I
believe this model. I'm not sure this model does anything
except set the stage for us to be able to investigate college
sports in a meaningful way that has to do with stating some
hypothesis that we believe and testing whether we reject it 
or fail to reject it. So here's a model.
We've got university administrators there telling ADs and
conference administrators what to do. Conference 
administrators and Ads can work through the NCAA to 
make policy choice happen. Or university administrators 
have the other option of going straight through the NCAA 
to make the same thing happen. So you've got this control 
where university admins work on ADs, they both work on
the NCAA, and out of it comes policy choice. So the way 
that I structured it, the university administrators monitor
this set up to run college sports.
And as the first panel pointed out that's an interesting, 
amorphous, difficult thing to “get your arms around”. But it
does happen at colleges and that almost forces us to look at 
what's going on at the university. We don't pay as much
attention to the clients and boosters of the engineering 
school when we wonder about whether or not the 
engineering school is doing what it ought to do with 
engineering students. We go to university administrators
and get them to sit down and think about what's going on.
So we can have a null hypothesis, a very basic null. 
Essentially, the NCAA is effectively providing what 
university administrators want. There are a small number of 
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epic fails. Every oversight system is going to have some 
probability of failure. University administrators don't want 
that to happen any more than anybody else does. But that's 
just the nature of the beast. So they're holding on for dear 
life steering the course of a good ship in the sea of life.
That allows us then to form an alternative hypothesis. The 
alternative is that there's abdication by university 
administrators and my basic model comes apart. The model 
unravels because admins aren’t doing their job. Abdication 
by university administrators, a “runaway” idea, has the tail 
wagging the dog and I can't help but put Reveille up there 
because sometimes the dog is the tail. Well, one good joke. 
Audience laughter.
It matters. I think it matters a lot, how we think about 
college sports. If we fail to reject the null, then we can go 
back to a long line of organization inquiry into college 
sports. My favorite goes back to Professor Fry in 1987. The 
problems then, don't go to what we think of as the NCAA. 
They go to college administrators. That's where the issue 
lies and that's where meaningful reform will happen.
If you reject the null then you get the problem observed by 
so many, namely, that we're driving athletics away from the
academic mission of the university. I just picked this as 
good a statement as any by the many organizations critical 
of college sports. This implies a need for further thoughts 
on regulation. But if you fail to reject it's all about
university administrators.
Something's going to have to happen to change their
margins. Admins make the choices right now. And if we're 
going to have meaningful reform, if we fail to reject the 
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null, it's going to have to be by changing the margins for 
university administrators. If you reject the null then it's all 
about reforming the NCAA, doing things through the 
NCAA, about the NCAA, including things like an antitrust
exemption.
That test has to be done. In my overview, my reading, my 
work, the sharpening of my pointy head up in the ivory 
tower, that I do day to day out, I'm unconvinced that the test
has been done very well. So that's what I'm doing. I'm sitting 
up there trying to do the tests, trying to find, what does this 
model look like? How is it performing? That's what I'm 
doing. And yes I think there is a lot of head banging
involved. But that's okay, I mean you know we're masochists
to even take on this job anyway.
Oh by the way you know that I could have chosen 
unionization, I could have chosen any number of topics. But 
some folks on Twitter said, “Well I hope the issue of the
antitrust exemption comes up” and I said, “Yeah it will.
Because I'm going to make it come up!”.
I tried tracking the college sports antitrust exemption down. 
I hope you'll inform me if I don't have the right lineage. It's 
extremely important we stand on big shoulders. I saw a
passing reference of it by Gary Roberts in a ‘95 piece. Andy 
Zimbalist has on more than one occasion advocated for it 
and described how life would look with an antitrust 
exemption. About the same time Matt Mitten and the folks 
over at the Marquette Law School were moving down the
same path.
The idea is to grant the NCAA a limited or full antitrust
exemption. This should gain you some power to steer the
NCAA in directions that you would like it to go. The
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comparable idea that I've seen concerns not-for-profits. You
can sort of nudge them in directions you would like them to
go by threatening their tax-free status. Good things can
happen. It could happen to the form of play.
If I recall right that was Professor Zimablist’s first shot at it.
We had this B.C.S. thing but a playoff is better in the eyes 
of at least a majority of the fans. But nobody's moving that 
way. Well if the NCAA had an antitrust exemption you 
might be able to threaten that exemption to get them to 
move in the direction of restructuring the championship. In 
addition to directing the championship in the F.B.S., 
threatening the antitrust exemption could work on the 
financial bottom line. Wasted spending is the Knight 
Commission’s focus. So is redirected spending towards
gender equity. And then there’s the whole long litany of
athlete rights, most of which I think were touched on by the 
first panel.
But what if the result of testing the null hypothesis was “fail 
to reject”? What if what is what's really going on is not
some sort of inability of the process to get a job done but
that the process is doing exactly what university
administrators want it to do? Which is to create a whole
bunch of values that don't appear on the books of the athletic
program, but instead occur across the rest of the university? 
And occur in a way that's reasonably effective, reasonably 
efficient, and can't be done any other way? Then the issue is 
with university administrators, not college sports per se.
Well now. The NCAA leadership is lobbying for the 
antitrust exemption. I think this might be getting lost on 
some folks. The NCAA leadership thinks, apparently, life 
for them will be better under the antitrust exemption than it 
would be under the current system on the current path 
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where they're not exempt. Where White v. NCAA can come 
along, O'Bannon v. NCAA can come along. Where Jenkins 
v. NCAA, which is the case right now, can come along and
tackle the NCAA head on, through the antitrust laws. 
Apparently NCAA leadership anticipated it would be better
for university administrator members to deal with Congress 
and not the courts. And I think there's ample historical 
evidence about why it would be better for them through 
Congress, from their perspective. Originally when Title IX 
passed there was a movement afoot to exempt football from 
Title IX. It was discussed at length. It was discussed at a
very high level in Congress. The “football exemption” didn't
pass but it was very clear that Congress was to a large extent 
on the side of the athletic directors on this one. Couldn’t 
make it happen but they were revealing their preference for 
the direction of college sports. It's not clear that the 
Congressional preference for college sports is the one that 
you want it to be if you are critics of the way the college
sports are working right now.
There's also been recently some fairly lackluster 
intervention threats and hearings on college football.  Most 
of that had to do with not moving towards a playoff relative 
to the B.C.S. and you know exactly where it came from. It 
came from Idaho and Hawaii and Utah. It came from all the 
places that were being excluded from being able to get a 
B.C.S. game, because of Congressional interest, because 
their constituents care.
So if the verdict is fail to reject that college sports is 
producing just what university administrators want, it could 
be the case then that the revoking of any hypothesized 
NCAA antitrust exemption is really not much of a threat. 
Remember, for the case of not-for-profit status, that threat is
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large and it's impact is easy to add up. It's easy to see what
would my tax situation be in the absence of a tax 
exemption.
In the case of a hypothesized antitrust exemption, it's taking 
an organization that since the 1950s has had many 
intrusions into its ability to run that 1950s model for its 
membership. And that's where they're starting from. Give
them an exemption where they think they'll be even better
off and your only threat is to put them back into a world 
where they're doing pretty good anyway. Which is the 
world that they're in right now.
By the way, we are still watching. White settled so it's not 
exactly clear what happened in terms of how well off or bad
off was the NCAA. O'Bannon is still under review at least.
I'm not a lawyer so I read what the lawyer’s say, and it
appears that they are wondering if the appeals court may 
well side the first finding on the issues that surround the 
amateur requirement. That is, that the amateur requirement 
is pretty much whatever the NCAA says it is, so it's not 
much of a requirement. But the lawyers I read also say that 
particular payments arrived at by the lower court aren’t 
going to fly. That they're going to maybe go in the direction 
of trying to let the NCAA figure out how to make that 
payment scheme happen. So it's not clear then that O'Bannon
has had the big impact yet on the operation of college sports 
by university administrators through the National Collegiate
Athletic Association that we think it has.
On Jenkins, Mr. Kessler is a very good lawyer. As was pointed
out he was counsel on the original NFL antitrust suit ‘91-
’94, depending on how you count it, that resulted in free
agency in the National Football League. And he’s had 
subsequent successes. Whether he'll have the same success
80
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss1/6
Fall] Pay for Play 259
 
against the NCAA remains to be seen, he’s certainly not the
first to give it a try.
And yet the amateur requirement still plods on and on. So 
whether revoking an antitrust exemption would be that big a 
threat remains to be seen as well. And in the meantime the 
NCAA by their observed behavior has made it clear that 
they think they're better off under the antitrust exemption
than they would otherwise be.
I think that gives us pause to use the null and alternative 
hypothesis idea to wonder sort of how would the world look 
under an antitrust exemption/ I think you should expect to
see minimal concessions. Agents might be allowed to 
participate, student athletes might be allowed to go test the 
draft waters and come back, for example. I don’t think that 
does significant harm really to the amateur model, or the 
ability to draw replacement players to college sports if it 
changes something about how and when and why athletes 
move from college to pro. There's a long waiting list of 
players to do just that. Given America's fascination with 
turning out nothing but the very best talent, nothing's going 
to get in the way of that anyway. There will be plenty of 
players lined up at the door.
So you should expect no truly costly reform success. I would 
be amazed to see the NCAA relent on the basics of the 
amateur requirement. Raising up to full cost of attendance is
a pittance. A million to two million bucks is the amount 
coming out in the press in particular places. These are on
athletic department budgets that range from $80 million to 
$225 million, and more. And the increase to full cost of 
attendance is just not that much money, relatively speaking.
Especially if the money is coming from university 
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administrators. Because now we're talking about how they 
might need another million or so in institutional support I 
don't know what the operating budget of Michigan State 
University is. I know some others. Michigan's operating
budget is about $4-6 billion a year. A million or so on that 
kind of money is—they spend more on toilet paper. Even if 
you go down to, say, my previous institution, Washington
State University. The operating budgets there between $400-
600 million a year. And again a million or so is just not that 
much money, just not that much.
So you'll see these marginal concessions but I’d be amazed 
if you'll see anything major. Because what's the stick? Oh 
we’ll take away your antitrust exemption. I mean, they 
would have enjoyed the exemption while they could but 
actually the world they were living in before the anti-trust 
exemption wasn't all that awful to begin with.
Doing the test, framing the world in this way and wondering, 
okay well, is it this nice tight little oversight activity that we 
see or is it not, helps us to sharpen our policy focus. It helps 
us to think about whom we are going to go after? Are we 
going to regulate the agent? Are we going to continue to 
focus on the NCAA, or are we going to start to get after 
what we think of as the principals in this activity, which are 
university administrators. And this did come up in the 
earlier discussion.
The upshot, if it's “fail to reject”, is that there needs to be, 
as there usually is at a university, a meaningful dialogue
about the proper place of Program A in the overall activity 
of the university. And it needs to be opened up in a 
discussion that includes all of the relevant participants so 
that the university ends up doing a good job for its 
constituency groups.
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My favorite example is the evolution of business schools
and higher education. You may not know that there hasn't
always been a business school at any given university. Now when
the academy first started to advance, it was a liberal arts
training program. Business schools and the like were viewed
as vocational and technical training, the benefits falling
primarily to the people who undertook that training. And if 
that's the case then that sounds like a really good thing to do 
privately. That sounds like a really good thing for 
businesses to do, train their students send them out right 
into those vocations. And there was a long and heated 
debate as constituent groups started to demand from their
universities that they have B-schools, that they train business 
decision makers.
At first it wasn't done very well. You could go through 
those curricula and you could see that they weren't highly 
academically rigorous. And the Academy criticized that in 
what you could only sort of describe as a real dogfight. 
Advocates for vocational education at institutions of higher 
learning versus the staunch liberal arts group. Well, they 
had a talk. And they had papers and they had conferences
and they had sessions all about well what can we do with the
B-school. Some said just continue to exclude it. We’re
liberal arts training. But the group that won were the ones 
that said let's just improve the academic content of what the 
business degree is all about. Let's make it a real for real 
academic degree that can stand up and hold its head up high 
with all the rest of the degrees on campus.
These dialogues can happen. These discussions can happen.
The point of the book that I just suggested to you at the end
of it all is as long as we continue to not do the test, as long 
as we continue to maybe not know what the real cause of 
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the problem is, the longer it's going to be easy for the NCAA
to obfuscate, the longer it's going to be easy for the NCAA 
to misrepresent, a lot easier and longer it's going to be for 
the NCAA to just continue doing business the way it's been 
doing it.
If we end up failing to reject then university administrators 
need to be called to the task of sitting down and figuring out 
what the heck they really ought to be doing with college 
sports on campus. I look forward to that discussion. The 
other discussions happening elsewhere are fine and they are 
lots of fun to write about because we can have a good time 
poking fun at the clearly inane positions the NCAA must
take because it's adopted a really stupid criteria like
amateurism. And that's lots of fun.
But is it progressing us at all, that's sort of my worry and my 
wonder. I suspect that if we keep working on the test we’ll 
get a better handle on that. And then maybe we’ll bring a 
good discussion of college sports to a place where we can 
handle that issue. 
Stephen Ross: Thanks for inviting me.  It is great to be 
here with some old friends and to meet some new ones. Let 
me provide a very quick, basic run through. To start with 
the basics, antitrust law is primarily designed passed for 
profit making companies, and it generally views joint
agreements as falling into one of two categories. Either the
joint agreement is an efficient promotion of consumer 
welfare – such as collaborating to make a new product -- or 
it is an anti-competitive regime to take monopoly profits 
from consumers and put them into the pockets of the 
conspirators. That's what antitrust is designed to distinguish 
and to prevent. The NCAA has a fundamentally different
model to fit into this round hole with its square peg. The 
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NCAA tries to cartelize as many markets as it can for the 
purpose of maximizing revenue. They were not allowed to 
do it in broadcasting by the Supreme Court in 1984. The 
purpose is to spend the money on what they consider to be 
worthy causes (and we can have a good debate about what
causes are worthy). But that is their model, that is why the
administrators seek to maximize revenue and minimize costs.  
The fundamental decisions are being made by university 
presidents, and I think it's a pretty weak claim to suggest 
that they're doing it to line their own pockets from their own
salaries. Further, NCAA member schools spend wastefully on a
bunch of things that they can't cartelize. But if they could, 
they would. When we talk about the high salaries paid to 
coaches, that was because of an antitrust decision that 
struck down restraints on coaches. If the NCAA could 
cartelize coaches' salaries to spend more money on what 
they think is worthy causes, they would; if they could agree 
on how to limit the size of locker rooms they would. The
NCAA used to have a rule limiting the number of colors 
you could use in a brochure to try to hold down printing 
costs.  As your economics professors will tell you, it is hard 
to organize a cartel and they just they just couldn't do it. But 
that's the NCAA model.
Now, this model of restricting competition to spend money on 
worthy causes is not a valid antitrust defense. Before William 
Howard Taft was President, he was a judge who wrote one of the 
most important anti-trust decisions in the history of antitrust law—
a case called United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Company.  
(Taft he went on after losing the presidency to President Roosevelt, 
to go to Yale Law School, where he wrote a book on the Sherman 
Act.)  He was an antitrust expert, and he wrote that to allow courts 
to decide when competition was in the public interest and when it 
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was not, is “to set sail on a sea of doubt.”  Of course, the Sherman 
Act is just a statute, what Judge Taft teaches is not that free 
markets should govern everything, but that if there was to be an 
exemption from the antitrust laws, it needs to be made by the 
elected representatives in Congress, not by the conspirators 
themselves trying to persuade the court. 
However, in my view what the NCAA is trying to do now in their 
Brief in the O’Bannon case is to persuade three judges sitting in 
San Francisco who serve with life tenure that competition is really 
not in the public interest. And so I hope that that argument fails. 
The only legal defense under the antitrust laws is that a restraint 
results in the efficient promotion of consumer welfare by 
differentiating your product.  Indeed, the NCAA has done a great 
job of doing that. I’ve talked to people who know way more about 
it than I do, but apparently there is no question that by any 
objective measurement the qualitative difference between major 
league baseball and AAA baseball is far narrower than the 
difference between the National Football League and Division 1 
and FBS Football. Yet, FBS Football is wildly popular—way more 
popular than minor league baseball. Why?  Because the NCAA has 
differentiated its product. There was discussion from the prior 
panel about how the notion of a student-athlete is somehow 
deceptive, but unless you want to sue for consumer deception, the
fraud doesn’t matter. I’ll give you another example. Like the 
difference between the NFL and FBS football, there is no question 
that the quality of the automobiles used in Indy Car and Formula 1 
racing is far superior to modified stock cars: the cars go faster, they 
are way better than NASCAR. Yet, NASCAR is very close if not 
exceeding them in popularity and competition.  Why? Because 
consumers think that the No. 88 Chevy Camaro driven by Dale 
Earnhardt, Jr. is something like the Camaro they are actually 
driving. In the history of NASCAR, this actually happened for one 
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race where they had a true stock cars; the engines overheated, the 
bolts fell off, and NASCAR decided to change the rules and ever 
since then, there is very little resemblance to what you could 
actually buy on a lot. But people still think that it’s true. So, it 
doesn’t matter whether a bunch of professors think that the student 
athlete name is a misnomer and a myth, what’s important from 
antitrust is whether fans think it’s a misnomer and a myth. 
This point can be illustrated by two fundamentally separate 
principles in NCAA rules: The NCAA says we want to promote 
amateurism, and I think Professor Fort and others have done a 
pretty good job of debunking the objective content of that term. 
But the NCAA also has a rule that says we want to maintain a clear 
line of demarcation between college sports and pro sports. That, in 
economic terms, is product differentiation, and that is a valid 
antitrust defense. 
What was the evidence in O’Bannon to support this product 
differentiation claim?  There was anecdotal evidence, which 
antitrust courts generally disregard, by athletic administrators who 
said “if we pay athletes nobody will come to their games,” but no 
empirical support for this claim. The NCAA presented a study that 
purported to show that people said that if you paid student athletes 
$50,000 a year on top of their scholarship, they would be less 
likely to go to the game. Cross-examination disclosed that many of 
the respondents didn’t understand the question, and they thought 
they were asked about illegal, under-the-table payments of 
$50,000.  Even so, it’s easy in a public opinion poll to say I’m not 
going to go to a game, there was no evidence that people would 
actually do that in any way. 
So, where are we right now? As I’ve argued in an article in the 
Penn State Law Review (A Rapid Reaction to O’Bannon: The Need 
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for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly Restrictive 
Joint Venture Schemes, co-authored with Marketing Professor 
Wayne DeSarbo), consider what would have happened if 
O’Bannon had never filed his lawsuit, and top football schools 
evolved into an autonomous situation, and the Power Five 
Conferences adopted a rule that required every student athlete to 
receive no more than the full cost of education, and required 
athletes to give all their image rights in perpetuity to the colleges 
as a condition of playing football, but provided them $5,000 a year 
to be put in a trust fund, which they can use at the end, and then 
some Alabama five-star recruit sued the Southesast Conference on 
the basis of that agreement. If the Alabama district judge followed 
Judge Wilken’s reasoning in the O’Bannon case -- up until she 
issues her order -- you would conclude that this agreement was 
illegal. As to the only defense recognized – that universities need 
to differentiate their product from the pros -- there is no evidence 
that you need to limit payments to $5,000.   There is a marketing 
technique, called conjoin analysis, that allows for pretty thorough 
survey research that gets you a little further to the question that 
where is the tipping point where people might stop paying 
attention and might stop going to games.  But there is no evidence 
that it is anywhere near $5,000. So, that’s one of the legal 
problems right now facing the O’Bannon case and as these things 
go forward. 
Turning to the policy aspects of this issue, the premise of antitrust 
law is that people in labor markets should receive the economic 
value of their work. What the previous panel glided over was that 
this principle of antitrust law is in contradiction with the 
fundamental purpose of labor law. Labor law is designed instead 
so that workers can cartelize the labor market for their own benefit 
to receive more than the economic value of their work; the law was 
passed in 1935 when Congress determined that, considering the 
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economic power of labor and capital in the marketplace, the 
market value is unfair to workers.  Moreover, on macroeconomic 
grounds Congress wanted to give more money to workers to 
increase their purchasing power to get out of the Great Depression.
I hope I am quoting Prof. Amy McCormick accurately; I believe 
she said (I hope I got this right), “It is unjust to take this earning 
power from them.”  The question is, who is the them?  It’s not 
exactly clear, but there is a very strong argument that the “them” 
who are currently receiving less than the economic value of their 
work – and I accept that big-time intercollegiate athletics is “work” 
-- are two or three players on every basketball team and ten or 
fifteen players on every football team.  They are the ones who 
really drive the value. If you look at the economic contribution of 
the rest of the football team, compared to who you could get next 
(a walk-on), the value may not be so much. 
The closest analogy I can think of is the motion picture industry. 
And if you look at the pay scales between--for a blockbuster movie 
and how much the A list actors get, and how much the sixth or 
seventh best actor gets on the play, it’s startling how little the 
seventh biggest actor gets.  The reason is not because they’re not 
contributing a key element to the movie, it’s because there are a lot 
of other actors who are just like them and if they don’t want to 
work for $200,000 on a $370 million movie, there is somebody 
else you can find to do the same thing. So, if we’re really talking 
about a free market principle, if that’s what is really driving us, 
there is no question that people are being exploited. But, I would 
suggest that, from a public policy perspective, it does make a 
difference if you think a free market will result in more money will 
all go to 85 football players, or, instead, a system where ten or 
fifteen people make well into six figures and the majority of 
marginal players at Michigan State and Penn State are actually 
having to pay part of their tuition, because the salary that they’re 
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getting from the University that reflects their economic value to the 
Spartans or Nittany Lions doesn’t even come close to their 
educational expenses.  
Let me conclude with some final comments about two related 
matters. One is the question of the antitrust exemption. I spent two 
years on the staff of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee. I 
actually worked on an antitrust exemption for local government. 
So I have sort of been there in the sausage grinde,r to paraphrase 
Bismarck. And there are a bunch of risks to really pushing full on 
for an antitrust exemption.  One is you won’t like the sausage that 
comes out at the other end. The second is the constant threat of 
further legislative meddling.  Once you get an exemption, you 
develop a bunch of rules in reliance of the exemption, and it 
becomes very costly and risky for a big organization like the 
NCAA or a professional sports league to do anything to jeopardize 
the exemption. And I have seen this in professional sports. Senator 
Arlen Specter made a political career out of this.  He theoretically 
opposed sports exemptions but never tried to end them, and every 
time a sports league did something he didn’t like, he would hold a 
hearing and threaten to take away their exemption. And then when 
they would move 10% of the way toward Sen. Specter by making 
some modest concession, he’d hold a big press conference with the 
leading sports authorities, shaking their hand and claiming credit. 
So, one of the problems with an exemption is it becomes a sword 
of Damacles that is always over the head of the NCAA. My 
prediction is things have to get a lot worse before all stakeholders 
agree that legislation is better than the status quo. As long as the 
NCAA thinks they have a chance to win the O’Bannon case, they 
are never going to agree to really meaningful exemptions that 
critics really like. Professor McCormick is not going to endorse an 
antitrust exemption that gives about a third of the loaf, where 
players going to be paid significantly less than she believes is 
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unjust, until she really thinks that otherwise things are just going to 
be terrible and even worse than they are today. 
My final comment is about an overlooked aspect of the cartel. If 
you look at the NCAA institutionally and legally, much of the 
problem can be attributed to a single one of the thirteen 
constitutional principles it has adopted. I’m not referring to the 
amateurism principle, which has no content and they don’t really 
follow it anyway.   It is the principle of “competitive equity.” It is 
the idea that an innovative proposal, that might well serve one or 
more of the other thirteen constitutional principles, is going to be 
defeated because some schools will be able to use it for 
comparative advantage.  There is a scene, which I understand was 
fiction, but is archetypically representative of my point, in the 
movie The Blind Side.  An officious NCAA investigator is grilling 
Michael Oher, the movie’s protagonist, about why he went to the 
University of Mississippi where his adoptive parents went, and she 
expresses a concern that other people might do this. And the point 
was that the NCAA would actually be concerned if maybe 500, or 
one thousand wealthy people with lots of extra money would find 
some poor, underprivileged kid, take them into their home, give 
them love, give them an education, give them tutoring, then might 
be able to steer this gifted athlete to their alma mater. The 
implication is that this would be terrible. Only an organization like 
the NCAA thinks like that, but that is a key aspect of the principle 
of competitive equity.  In sum, if we are thinking about a reform 
model, rather than purely antitrust regulation, my suggestion is the 
place to start would be for the NCAA to repeal the competitive 
equity principle, and in fact declare that any proposal that is 
motivated by competitive equity is an illegitimate proposal that 
internally should be barred by NCAA procedures.  I look forward 
to the views of people who have been thinking about this issue 
longer than I have and the Q&A. Thank you very much for your 
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attention. 
Dr. Richard Southall: Thank you. I want to thank Michigan State 
University, and the Journal of Business and Securities Law for 
inviting me. For an English, history, and philosophy major from 
Western State Colorado University, this is a huge treat and honor 
to be on a panel with such esteemed colleagues. I hope that by the 
end of this presentation or this discussion, you’ll be able to connect 
my work to an antitrust setting. A great deal of my work involves 
institutional propaganda, and how the NCAA has used institutional 
propaganda as an antitrust defense strategy. So, I was really happy 
today when John talked about in the previous panel is that part of 
litigation is building or telling a story—because that’s really what 
the NCAA is wonderfully good at doing. So, today I’m going to 
talk a little bit about the concept of institutional propaganda and 
then I’ll highlight several examples of the NCAA’s college sport 
institutional propaganda. And then we’ll examine how that 
institutional propaganda has been used as an antitrust defense 
strategy. And I’ll also point out nuanced changes in institutional 
propaganda elements the NCAA has utilized during the various 
stages (e.g., pretrial, trial, appeal) of the O’Bannon case. 
Dr. Emmert – the President of the NCAA – testified before 
Congress this past summer and noted that for the vast majority of 
those who participate in NCAA sports, the experience is exactly 
what it is intended to be—a meaningful extension of the 
educational process. So, when we analyze that statement, we know 
he is talking about the vast majority of the 460,000 or more NCAA 
athletes that are mentioned in the NCAA’s public service 
announcements (PSAs). However, most people do not know (Dr. 
Staurowsky is probably one of the few people in attendance today 
who does know this.) that when the NCAA first developed the now 
familiar tag line (“460 students-athletes going pro in something 
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other than sports.”), the athletes to which the NCAA referred did
not include all athletes. When Diane Dickman of the NCAA was 
asked, “Where did you come up with that number?” she noted that 
when the NCAA developed that figure, which has grown from 
280,000 to 460,000 to now more than 500,000 athletes, there were 
two categories of athletes who were excluded from that 
computation: FBS football, and Division I men’s basketball 
players. These athletes were not included in the original figure. 
Most often when Dr. Emmert acknowledges concerns, challenges 
and issues with FBS football and NCAA D-I men’s basketball 
players, he also mentions these athletes represent only 3.5% of all 
NCAA athletes. So what is he saying? That’s not a rhetorical 
question. What is he saying? Somebody . . . [AUDIENCE 
MEMBER] “It’s not a problem with that may people.” Yeah, it’s 
okay. There’s not that many people in the sweatshops. And we like 
our cheap shoes. 
Dan Woodenfield, the NCAA expert economist at the O’Bannon 
trial called the NCAA a joint venture—we hear about joint venture 
in the earlier panel, which I thought was a very interesting term—
between the organization and the colleges. The NCAA is a three–
part institution: the national office, members, and the organization 
or the governance structure (e.g., committees, etc.).. He called it a 
type of cartel, but not classic price fixing for profit variety that we 
were talking about earlier. And then, the NCAA attorneys 
characterized it as a benevolent cartel. The NCAA lawyer, Greg 
Kurtnan said, “It’s a cartel that does good things, not a cartel that
does bad things.” 
Now, I have been to Colombia by the way. I’ve spent time in 
Medellin. I was in Colombia when Pablo Escobar was a drug 
kingpin. In many ways, Escobar did a lot of really good things for 
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“his” people. So, when the NCAA says, “While we’re involved in 
anticompetitive things, and we’re violating the law, but we’re not 
bad!” So, the concept I use a great deal is hegemony:  the 
spontaneous consent given by the great mass of the population to 
the general direction imposed on the public by a small group of 
powerful individuals. It’s the more powerful folks—economically, 
socially, politically—telling the rest this is the appropriate thing to 
do. Such spontaneous consent can be achieved through pressure, 
coercion, and force, but most often it is achieved through language. 
Through language. Thought control achieved by creating and 
reinforcing “common sense.” 
This common sense is conveyed through dooms-day scenarios and 
statements such as: “If ‘student-athletes’ are ‘paid,’ college sports 
as we know it will end! We can’t pay college athletes! Can’t do it. 
It’s too complex.” Really? Why? It’s pretty basic in many ways. 
However, the defendants in the O’Bannon trial have consistently 
warned that if the plaintiffs prevailed, it would end college sport as
we know it. 
How many of you have been to a Michigan State Football game? 
How many of you had a good time? If that goes away, what will 
you do? What will you do? 
Hegemony is sustained through the use of language and symbols. 
Watch any NCAA broadcast and you can see how such broadcasts 
are packaged, re-presented, put together. College sport broadcasts 
are spot-on examples of institutional propaganda, which 
institutions utilize as risk management or protection mechanisms. 
A classic example of institutional propaganda has been discussed 
earlier today—the term, “student athlete.” I had a student, a 
graduate student at the University of North Carolina email me the 
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last couple of days with an idea of having  a “student athlete’s” 
rights conference. I wrote the student back and said, “I appreciate 
your sentiment, but why are you using the ‘oppressor’s language’ 
in proposing an athlete’s rights conference?” He responded, “I 
never thought about this.” Most people can’t stop using that term. 
His response is fascinating because it reflects linguistic 
manipulation and dissemination that’s very purposeful. The term 
“student athlete” in the collegiate model—we’ll talk more about 
where that term came from— is central to how the NCAA 
differentiates college athletes from the business of college sport 
enterprise. 
An example of this linguistic manipulation is the argument that the
fundamental reason you cannot pay college athletes is because they are 
studentsnot employees. Why aren’t they employees? Because,
we don't pay them. Why don't we pay them? Because, they're
not employees. This is clearly an example of circular reasoning, 
but it’s like, “Really? Where are we going with this?” But that's a 
very effective argument, because we must avoid at all cost: 
“Pay for play.” I loved the title of this symposium.
Technically we can never pay college athletes within the 
NCAA system, because Bylaw 12.02.8. By the way, 
studying the NCAA Manual is akin to being a rabbinical 
scholar. 
In the NCAA Manual “pay” is defined as, “The receipt of 
funds awards or benefits not permitted by the governing 
legislation of the Association for participation in athletics.” 
So, if we ever approve payment of funds, what can it not be? 
Pay. This is because, since this compensation is now 
approved, it is no longer “pay.” 
So when Mark Emmert says, “We will never pay college 
athletes.” Well of course you won't, because your Bible says 
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if you approve it, by its definition it is no longer pay. It's a 
stipend. Look up the word. Stipend. First thing in the 
definition. What word is first in the definition of stipend? 
“Pay.” We're not going to pay them, but we will give them a 
stipend. Really, it’s pay! 
OK, we're not going to pay them, but we're going to give
their parents $3 thousand to go to a C.F.P. – College Football 
Playoff game. We're going to give them full “cost of
attendance.” How are you going to raise the full amount? 
What is the gap? We’ll give them some money. But you're 
not going to pay them!
As I go through these linguistic gyrations, it seems as if I'm 
back in the 60s. It seems as if I’m “Woodstuck,” still living in 
the 60s. Moving on to a discussion of another example of 
NCAA institutional propaganda, let’s examine its “Collegiate 
Model of Athletics,” a term used repeatedly in the pretrial 
phase of the O'Bannon case. In 2003 Myles Brand and Wally 
Renfro developed the collegiate model nomenclature as a 
means to articulate a better understood definition of 
amateurism. 
So what is the collegiate model that Brand discussed? Brand
once said, “We must not be drawn to the professional model 
like moths to a flame.” Wow! What an interesting simile. 
Michigan State is just flying around like a moth, and the next 
thing you know you’re fried. If we go there (to the 
professional model), if we pay college athletes, it’s so bad that 
it leads to being burned alive! 
Let me ask a question: “Why are you in law school?” To 
become a lawyer. But what if my firm’s policy is we don’t 
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pay lawyers until after they’ve completed four years of 
service. Sorry, it's against our firm's policy. We don't pay 
amateur lawyers. You generate revenue for our firm, but we 
have a policy that your first four years, we give you an office, 
provide you with CEUs, allow you to gain valuable 
experience, and provide you with cost of living allowances. 
However, we'll let you take on cases, and bill clients for your 
services, but all the revenue flows to the firm. We’re 
providing you with valuable training for the next job you take, 
or you can go pro after four years of our arrangement.
This is analogous to the collegiate model, since those who 
participate in collegiate athletics must be students attending a 
university. The fundamental reason college athletes, some of 
whom generate millions of dollars in revenue, are unpaid is
that they are students, not employees. The old fashioned 
concept of amateurism is a tough sell to some people, 
so what did the NCAA do? 
They rebranded amateurism. In the president's briefing memo
that was prepared for president Emmert is the following 
language. “Critical to begin reestablishing through 
messaging the concept of the collegiate model. Also 
critical is to understand this term serves as a template for 
behavior.” The collegiate model is a “term of art” created by
Myles Brand as a surrogate, but not a replacement, for the 
concept of amateurism. According to the collegiate model, 
“amateur defines the participants, not the enterprise.” 
That's a direct quote: “Amateur defines the participants,” 
(the players) “not the enterprise.”
So for everybody on the enterprise side, the business side,
boom let’s make as much dang money as possible. Dr. Brand
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said university athletic departments have a “moral
obligation” to maximize revenues in order to provide the
good benefits for the athletes who will go pro in something 
other than sports. In other words, it is okay to screw the 3%
of the college athletes who have a large market value, so 
that the 97% who have no market value can get what they
want – a chance to participate in college sport. In order to 
justify this exploitation, intercollegiate athletics has to be tied
to higher education.
However, we need to tie intercollegiate athletics to higher 
education without imposing its avocational nature on
revenue producing opportunities.
According to the collegiate model framework, as amateurs, 
college athletes are engaged in college sport as an avocation 
– sort of a hobby. But for the director of marketing, it’s a no
hobby dude! You better generate revenue, or we’ll fire you.
But the athletes, you know, it's just an avocation, just a 
hobby. So another necessary linguistic manipulation is to make
sure college sport is identified as an educational endeavor. How is 
this connection made? Through the development of a graduation rate 
metric that results in higher and higher graduation rates, so the public can 
feel good about athletes getting an education (e.g., graduating). 
So at the same time Dr. Brand created the Collegiate Model of Athletics, 
the NCAA developed and launched its Graduation Success 
Rate (GSR). In 2003, as part of its Academic Progress 
Program (APP) the GSR was introduced. This metric had 
been in development since 1985, in response to public 
pressure that was the result of low graduation rates of 
football and men’s basketball players.
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The NCAA looked at the current methodology, the Federal 
Graduation Rate (FGR), and developed the GSR in 
response. The FGR is basically the number of first-time, 
full-time students who graduate in six years. You have 10
students who enroll full-time in year 1; six receive their 
diploma from that university after six years. Your FGR is 
60%. 
But the NCAA also began tracking athletes who left an 
institution in good academic standing (e.g., dropped out or 
transferred). They calculated a graduation rate that removed 
these athletes from the computation.
So think about it. If in a particular sample of 10 athletes who 
came to university X, only four of graduated, that would 
result in a FGR of 40%, which is a low number. But the 
question is how might you make that number more 
palatable? You can’t increase the FGR in any other way 
than having more athletes actually graduate in six years. 
But what can we do to increase the graduation rate we 
report? We need to look at the six who didn’t graduate and 
see if we can remove them from the denominator (e.g., 
reduce the 10 athlete sample.). 
Well, out of those six who did not graduate, let’s say four
left in good academic standing. If we remove them from the 
cohort (the denominator), then we are only dealing with a 
sample of six total athletes. If we divide six into four, we’re 
going to get a “graduation” rate of 80%. 
This removal of athletes who transfer or leave in “good
academic standing” from the sample results in large 
increases in graduation rates. Look at the increases that 
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result from the use of this methodology: 67%, 49%, and 
58%. Large increases. And what do we call that metric? We 
call it the Graduation Success Rate, with an emphasis on the 
word “success,” as if we don't already know graduation is our 
proxy for success. It's Marketing 101. “New and Improved.”
What’s interesting is where this adjustment had the most 
effect. In which two sports? Surprise: football and men's 
basketball. The GSR results in higher relative graduation 
rates in those two sports more than any other. 
Why is this important? These are the athletes who are the 
labor that’s generating the revenue. They are workers. So
what happened? From 2003 to this date the NCAA, in its 
messaging, consistently says the federally mandated rate is 
inaccurate. The GSR is a better, more accurate, more real-
time measure of graduation. And while they've never named
a single university president who supposedly asked for the
GSR, they say the GSR was developed at the request of 
college presidents who felt the FGR was inaccurately
representing the life of college athletes.
Of course, if you’re a college president, are you going to
turn down a graduation metric that makes you look better?
Of course not! It’s called risk management. So the NCAA 
and its member universities consistently identify the GSR as
an improved a more accurate metric that consistently results 
in record graduation rates. So Dr. Brand could show his 
academic reform program was successful by referring to 
record GSRs. What happens with the G.S.R. every year? You
have incremental increases of about 1% a year. So we have 
a record every year. We’re better than ever. The NCAA 
used GSR rhetoric throughout the O'Bannon trial. 
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If you watch a YouTube streaming of the O'Bannon appeal 
you’ll notice a subtle change in strategy. In this phase of the 
case,  the focus is on “pay for play.” The defense attorneys’ 
consistent messaging was the amateur model bars all forms
of “pay.” We have rules that protect amateurism. The athlete
must not be paid. However, the NCAA argued we can
“reimburse” athletes for reasonable expenses related to their 
educational experience, or their status as “students.” But, 
notably, the NCAA insisted reimbursement for reasonable 
expenses is not…pay. Because, oh my god, if we “pay” 
them, it will be the end of mankind as we know it. We have 
to maintain the “tradition of amateurism” and the rules of 
amateur eligibility. 
As I watched the court proceedings I kept track of the 
number of times they used the term “pay for play.” So now 
they've shifted their focus from using the collegiate model 
to a focus on payments to athletes. 
So now it's pay for play. All three of these institutional 
propaganda tactics have been used as defense strategies by 
the NCAA in antitrust cases, and also utilized in media 
relation’s campaigns since 2003.
The effectiveness of the NCAA’s institutional propaganda 
was evident in Judge Wilken’s ruling, which was ostensibly 
in favor of the plaintiffs. In her opinion, she used the term
“student athlete” 277 times. It is fascinating to me that a
court would be so sloppy in the use of their language in
writing an opinion. But many observers have noted the
plaintiffs didn't actually prevail. And so we'll see where this 
is going to go moving forward. 
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Paige Szymanski: Thank you.
Dr. Richard Southall: Thank you for this.
Dr. Ellen Staurowsky: It's after lunch, I’m the eighth
speaker baby. I have quite a mountain to climb. Hi 
everybody, I’m a roamer as well. And I've been assured that 
I'll be able to tidy up my remarks in terms of the transcript 
and I anticipated that I was going to go off the mark in 
terms of exactly what my intention is because there are so 
many teachable moments in terms of things that have come
up earlier today that strike me as maybe needing to be tidied 
up or maybe finished up a little bit as we get to the end of 
the program. 
This is my general plan. I’m going to talk a little bit about 
the business of the NCAA. I was taking off of the title of 
the program to look at the business of the NCAA, to look at
the tools of “player control” as I call them, otherwise known
as NCAA rules and language. And then offer some 
concluding thoughts along the way. But I begin with David 
Ferrie. Anybody know who David Ferrie is? In the film 
J.F.K., David Ferrie is a character that is someone who may 
know something about whether or not John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated. A lawyer is asking him about whether or not he
knows. And frantically, he is pacing up and down in a room, 
and he has a drug habit so he is really over the top. And he 
is repeating over and over and over again, “Who the hell
knows, who the hell knows!” It's a mystery wrapped in a
riddle inside an enigma. And I think that as the day has gone
on, that one of the lessons that we learned in terms of trying 
to deal with college sport’s issues, is that this idea of a 
mystery wrapped in a riddle inside an enigma, is exactly 
102
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol16/iss1/6
Fall] Pay for Play 281
 
and precisely where the NCAA wishes and wants you to be 
and will do everything in its power to make sure that you 
do not get out of. 
And so our contemplation about language is really, I think, 
very important to the conversation where the root of these 
terms come from, what the history is behind them, the 
legacies that they carry forward, are things that deliver to us 
the contradictions, the hypocrisies, the problems, the 
motivations that lead us to the point where we want to 
challenge them. And hopefully do right in the midst of all 
of this. And so hopefully by the time we get to the end of it 
we will throw out this concept that it's a mystery, wrapped 
in a riddle, inside an enigma because it is not nearly as 
complicated as the NCAA would have us believe, at least in 
my view. 
Interesting, in terms of the O’Bannon hearing from March 17th,
St. Patrick's Day, here are two quotes. Seth Waxmen 
presented on behalf of the NCAA in its appeal to O’Bannon.
And one of the first things he said was the following: “The 
NCAA was founded so that athletes must not be paid.” You 
heard the history of the NCAA stated to you by John Adam 
earlier today. And by Amy McCormick talking about how
there have been deaths and injuries in football and that was a 
precipitating factor. This was not a motivation. This notion of 
the NCAA being founded so that athletes must not be paid. 
Not 1906. And maybe not ever. Maybe not ever from a 
historical standpoint, and I’ll explain what I mean by that in 
a minute. I did find it interesting later on that there was a
clear statement also from Waxman that “we, the NCAA,
define what ‘pay’ constitutes.” And point of fact if you go
into that four hundred forty four page rulebook, one of the
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bylaws has a definition of pay, and it essentially says exactly
that. The NCAA is not opposed to pay; it is supposed to pay
under terms and conditions that it does not approve of.
Interesting way to define amateurism. Because our 
sensibilities about amateurism is that we cannot get paid. I 
mean point to fact, the NCAA objects to payment on its 
terms and conditions, which it approves. Now Dr. Emmert 
has been mentioned a number of times I just felt like he 
needed to see is picture in case you haven’t yet today. There 
is an interesting moment in the congressional hearing that Dr. 
Southall participated in. And it had to do with the athletic
scholarship.
The athletic of scholarship was adopted by the NCAA in 
1956. And at that time, one of the reasons why they
adopted it was because they cannot regulate pay to the
degree that they wanted to. They had some schools that 
were paying, they had other schools that weren’t, and they 
had some schools that were doing things under the table.
What to do with such an unruly crowd? Well. Concede.
We're no longer opposed to pay. But we will create a
mechanism called a grant in aid, what we popularly refer to
as an athletic scholarship, and that that will manage the
relationship that way. In 1956 it was adopted for a four-
year time frame. By 1973, we went to a one-year 
scholarship. And in the course of the hearing, Dr. Emmert 
was asked why that is actually was, why it was that that
decision had been made. It was very interesting, his
response, because he said, to Senator Rockefeller, he said,
“I don't know the answer to that question and I’m 
reasonably sure that no one knows.” 
Now. Richard. I was sitting in the very back of the 
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audience. It’s not participatory democracy when you're in 
there. Because I'm going to raise my hand and say, “I'm 
going to that question for you.” But what is interesting is
that the head of the NCAA said that he did not know and 
especially in light of the events here and the number of 
transcripts and the amount of history that had been brought
to bear on their name for their business practices. I’ll
return to that in a minute.
But I think these statements are laying a foundation for the 
kind of business that we are actually talking about. And
then I wanted to really get into a little bit of the specifics
about the business. Has anybody seen this? What do you
know about it?
Audience Member: I just know that is in Indianapolis, where the 
Final Four is this year. And they have projected or somehow put 
the whole bracket up on the side of the hotel that is where the 
Final Four is going to be, to build up hype.
Dr. Ellen Staurowsky: Yeah, I mean that's a good summary
of what's going on here. So it's a sixteen story – sixteen story 
– bracket right in downtown Indianapolis. Does anybody
know what kind of a deal the NCAA has with the city of
Indianapolis relative to its headquarters? Which also in 
Indianapolis.
Dr. Richard Southall: It is surrounded by a moat.
Dr. Ellen Staurowsky: That's true there's one. The NCAA
ended up in Indianapolis after working out a deal with a 
$15 million incentive for them to come to take their 
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business to Indianapolis. So they got that $15 million dollar
subsidy to come and they pay a dollar rent every year. A 
dollar rent. OK. At least according to projections, and Rod I 
know that you'll appreciate this, and we can have like a
whole other panel on how accurate this figure is. But what 
they are projecting is that the business that will be brought to 
Indianapolis for the final four is going to be $70 million in
economic impact. In this city and enough of us alone. I
think the reason why this is important is to my thinking 
relative to how the business works. Is that we talk about the 
member schools we talk about the NCAA as an institution 
or an entity that is representative of colleges and
universities. But this is also an institution unto itself. It has
its own self-interests and has its own five hundred employees
who are contributing to the economy of Indianapolis. And 
so in terms of the interests of the parties involved, this is 
not just simply a mouthpiece for whatever colleges and
universities tell it to do that it has its own interests at heart as 
well. And notably the one party, which is not a member to this, 
is the athletes. The athletes are not members of the NCAA
College and universities are. The NCAA itself is its own
institution. But athletes themselves are not members. Now 
in terms of the clear line of demarcation between 
professional sport and college sport. There is a distinction
perhaps in brand. I'm not so sure that that really makes them
any less professional. When we look at the Nielsen state of
the media. In terms of viewership we see that NFL’s Super 
Bowl clearly is king and has been for a long time and 
continues that way. But you'll see college football playoffs
are next, the Sugar Bowl, the Rose Bowl. The three top-ranked 
cable programs in the history of cable T.V. back in January. 
We see the NCAA championship just under the NBA
Christmas game. And then we see the NCAA in terms of 
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viewership. And so let's make no mistake about this. This is a
business that is not about amateurs. This is about the pros 
and college sport intends to run with this group. This is
what their business practices are- they intend to be successful 
to outpace the NBA This is their full intention. When we 
talk about the industry we often talk about the big dollars 
that are associated with the industry itself. We hear about 
the twelve-year $10.8 billion television contract with 
C.B.S. and Turner for example. We hear about $1.5 million 
at they go with a final four and with the men's basketball 
tournament which compares almost to the dollar to what we 
have with Super Bowl ads for instance. But what I think we 
miss when we talk about the largest of the financial stakes 
is that we forget that so many other industries are built on
this labor. If we just look here we see that part of the 
ESPN’s expansion has been expressly the result of college 
sport. ESPN network, Longhorn Network, ESPNU. And 
then of course the programming that goes into classic and 
into the others as well. So this industry, which helps to keep 
Disney afloat, is built in large part on the college sports 
industry. And then we also have this contradiction. And I 
just want to pause for a second let you look at this. This is
one of the more fascinating shots I think. But the countdown 
to the brackets is much less than that now of course. In 
terms of the profit that Las Vegas is expecting to turn as a 
result of March Madness, they're expecting to make a 
hundred million dollars in profit just for this month. So 
when we think about the financial stakes involved. I think
when we hear discussions about profitability and about
revenue generation. I think we forget about this magnitude 
of other industries that are connected to the core. So we 
have tourism. We have merchandising. We have the 
gambling industry. There are all of these other satellite 
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industries that oftentimes get overlooked. And they're 
important because of what we're talking about relative to
player value and the control over player value. Because all
of these entities are profiting off of the business practices 
that the NCAA has adopted. Now in terms of tools to 
control an unnamed an unrecognized labor force. Now I do 
believe that this is the case. We see the grenade. We see a
quote unquote student athlete. And we've got amateurism as 
well. And we actually have the. And Richard you did a 
beautiful job of kind of mapping out sort of the rolling 
media relation’s strategy to constantly require us to follow 
the bouncing ball relative to what the core issue actually is 
in this entity and what’s actually going on. And I'm going 
to talk about those terms and some others as we move
forward. Periodically, I hear people say that they were 
surprised. They were surprised by Northwestern. John Adam
earlier said that people could never imagine or expect that
college football hires would sign union cards. That they 
couldn’t imagine or expect that O’Bannon would take 
exception to the use of his image and that this one day 
would be litigated in court; that they just couldn't expect
those things would happen. And my suggestion to you is
that it is not only expected, but I think it is likely that if we 
do not get meaningful change then we are going to continue 
to see more and more cases in one way or another coming 
back until this gets resolved in a way that's favorable to
athletes. I think you do need to put into perspective or at 
least I think it's helpful to put into perspective that we've 
had athletes starting in 1936 who were boycotting their 
program. And take a look at the reasons why they were 
boycotting. They were boycotting because of medical
coverage. They were boycotting because of food and they 
were boycotting because of campus jobs.
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Compensation. Food. Medical coverage. That's 1936. It 
comes all the way through to today. You  have been 
bombarded with the use of the term student athlete being a 
response to the worker compensation cases in a way to 
avoid worker compensation and intentionality there. I want 
to pause here though, because if you stop at the term 
student athlete I think you miss a big piece of the entire 
picture of what was going on relative to player control. In 
1956 we had the grant that gets adopted. The athletic 
administrators at that time understood that it was pay for 
play. That's what's so interesting about the way that we use 
this expression today. Fritz Crisler who was the athletic 
director at Michigan at the time was quoted as saying that he
understood, that they understood, that by adopting this 
practice they were reserving the right to exploit and to 
professionalize athletes under their own terms and
conditions. They were taking it away from other entities and 
they were creating the opportunity for them to exploit and 
professionalize under the terms and conditions that were
convenient to the athletic entity. There were athletic
directors at that time that understood what this meant. But 
in 1967 we have a development that occurs in terms of the 
fraudulent misrepresentation will. Does anybody have any 
idea what that means, a fraudulent misrepresentation will? 
Do we have any former scholarship athletes or current 
athletes in the room? Had you ever heard of this rule? 
Audience Member: No.
Dr. Ellen Staurowsky: It would apply to you. And there
we have it. I teach this one course on college sport policy and
literally every day with the athletes who are in the room, we
end the day by saying, “What did we learn today that we 
didn't know?” And there's always some rule that they 
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signed their life away on in terms of their athletes statement 
or were like, “We don't know that rule was out there.” 
Fraudulent misrepresentation rule effectively gave license to
coaches to be able to unload athletes who they felt were 
either acting in bad faith or that they just simply wanted to 
get rid of because they were dead wood or they were injured
early or there was some kind of reason. Fraudulent 
misrepresentation, that’s 1967. And you notice that only a 
couple of years later we end up with a one your scholarship
rule.
There's something else that's going on here in terms of the 
1967 time frame. Because it's in 1967 or earlier that we
have protests on campus- we have the athletic revolution
that's going on, we have a black athlete revolts going on. 
This is a time period when we have an attempt to integrate 
formally white teams. And so all of these concerns about
player behavior and how coaches are going to manage
players percolates around during this period of time. One of
the articles that captures this moment is one that was written 
by Sports Illustrated writer John Underwood. It was 
referred to as “The Desperate Coach.” And in this article he 
chronicles coach after coach- football coach, basketball 
coach, coaches at universities all across the country who are 
lamenting that they cannot control their athletes because 
they cannot run dictatorships the way that they would like. 
And so we end up with a fraudulent misrepresentation rule. 
But that isn't enough so we go to the one-year scholarship.
One-year scholarship which effectively creates the
opportunity to get rid of athletes at-will. So what's 
significant about this is not only the intentionality of what 
occurs in the control mechanism, but also what occurs 
within the athlete population. Because it takes. pretty much
from 1973, to White in 2006, Oliver in 2009, Jeremy Bloom 
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in 2002-ish. It takes all of that time before we really see
athletes really litigating to try to go after their right. So this
mechanism creates a culture of fear, threat, and retaliation 
that is one of the most effective means of shutting down
player dissent. And it shuts it down so that when we litigate 
today we still have athletes who will say behind the scenes
that they cheer us on. But they do not want to come forward.
When Kain Colter came forward that was an act of 
tremendous courage on his part because the payback for 
any athlete who does that is going to be considerable. Life in
the locker room was never the same for him again. Never
again. Those coaches treated him differently. They put
pressure on him. And this is part of what is going on here. 
And this is the stakes that I think are so high. 
And this whole mix of conversation around whether or not
the system will be broken, whether or not there is going to
be college sport Armageddon, if college athletes are
recognized for the value that they bring to the table. 
Women's sport gets pulled into this primarily in terms of 
Title IX. I want to direct your attention to this quote from 
Donna Shalala from 2011, and she says: “Those of us in the
business know that universities have been end running Title 
IX for a very long time. And they do it until they are caught.” 
So my question to you was this- if all these conference 
commissioners of the NCAA, administrators, if all of the 
college athletic directors who you hear invoke Title IX every 
time we get close to having some kind of fairness for the 
revenue producers was so committed to Title IX, then why is
there such a history that Donna Shalala’s talking about. This
isn’t a system that is committed to either equity and it has
built itself on exploitation. The two actually do go hand in
hand but not the way that you think, in my view. The same
system that has ignored this piece of federal legislation with 
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impunity for over forty years is just as likely to thumb their 
noses at any other legislation that comes down the pipe 
until such time as they are held accountable. But it's part of 
the con game to think that this is a commitment to Title IX. 
I want to close out with a couple of things for you to 
consider. Earlier in the question and answer there was an
observation about amateurism. How many times is 
amateurism cited in the manual? A student said it earlier.
Audience Member: A ton. Hundreds and hundreds of 
times. 
Dr. Ellen Staurowsky: I was a little concerned about your 
health actually that you knew that. [Audience laughter]. 
But think about this for a minute. The NCAA defense in 
terms of amateurism is that it is the pillar of college sports. 
Now, one would think that a pillar would be a pillar- right,
that it would be pretty solid. Not to be kind of cast in the
ground. That come an earthquake it would still pretty much
be there at the end of the day. A lot of people don't know 
that there’re actually three different operatingdefinitions 
depending on which manual you look at. There's a different 
amateurism definition for Division 3, Division 2 and, 
Division 1. And interestingly enough the way that the term 
gets applied is actually much more liberal in Division 3 
when it comes to paid athletes. Paid athlete absolutes pretty 
much can come into the system when they want to. But the 
control mechanism gets tighter and tighter the closer you 
get to the revenue producers. Revenue producers are the
ones that are controlled most under amateurism. And even a
Division 3 is more liberal a standard than is Division 1. So
that tells us something about the pillar. Richard, you talked 
about how in Judge Wilkin’s ruling that she uses the term 
student athlete 277 times. If you look in contrast at 
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Regional Director Ohr’s opinion in Northwestern. He never 
uses that term except when he is quoting something 
specifically from the NCAA He refers only to college
football players, to college athletes. He never uses that term.
And for those of you who are thinking about going on and 
maybe doing this kind of work. The one thing that you 
really have to do in my view, is you have to get out of the 
NCAA box. The NCAA for many years has had this kind of 
mystique about it so that in terms of rules and regulations, 
college administrators for example- they will defer to their
athletic department, provost presidents. They will say about 
all manner of things relative to the NCAA They will kind of 
give up authority and they will say to the athletic director 
when you tell me what this is. As lawyers, if you want to 
litigate against the NCAA get out of their manual. Get out 
of their terminology. Do not use student athletes when you 
know that it was an invention specifically designed to avoid 
worker compensation. Get out of that terminology. Because
the more you do that, the more you interrupt them. And one 
of the things that they are facing now is the fact that it is 
harder and harder to defend these principles that they have
been so effectively doing for so many years.
And so I’ll leave you with this thought as well. I thought it 
would be interesting to sort of just sponsor like a, “Don't 
use student athletes for an entire day.” Like in an athletic 
department. And just like how you would have a jar if you 
cursed and you put a quarter in. I am telling you it would be 
a major fundraiser. It would be a major fundraiser if people 
just stop using the term. So that might be a way to appeal 
some of this litigation. Anyway. I'll close on that. Thank 
you all very much. 
Audience: [Applause].
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Paige Szymanski: Thank you Dr. Staurowsky and all the 
panelists. First I want to give any of the panelists an
opportunity to comment on anything else that you have right 
now before we start asking questions. No more comments? 
I’ll open it up to the floor.
Audience Member: I do you have questions about what 
you're talking about regarding propaganda. I don’t 
remember what the other two were but Big Ten 
Commissioner DeLaney said, or there’s two things he said
last year to do with your comments. He said if pay for play 
is approved by any of the Big Ten universities, he said they 
would be kicked out of the conference. And he also said if 
the O’Bannon case got approved we’re going to D3 which 
means no athletic scholarships and we’re going to 
downsize. So that's part of what you’re talking about, is that 
something that he could really do if it did happen?
Professor Stephen Ross: Well there are a few things to 
share about some of the rhetoric that athletic administrators 
use. If you look at the language of the NCAA rule in their 
definition of pay, it is virtually identical in legal 
significance if not rhetoric to the NBA salary cap.  You 
cannot receive anything of value, under NCAA rules, 
unless it is approved under the rules.  The NBA has the 
same rule. You cannot receive any compensation for your 
services as an NBA player except for compensation that is 
authorized under the NBA salary which is which is 
collectively bargained for. The only difference is the salary
cap is a lot higher in the case of the NBA.  
The second thing is to have some skepticism about these
threats.  In the 1980s, I was working at the Senate Judiciary
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Committee after the Oakland Raiders case, which a lot of 
the professional sports leagues, in particular the National 
Football League, didn't like. Paul Tagliabue was the 
attorney for the NFL at the time. In any litigation, he would 
argue that the Raiders' case was this very narrow fact 
specific precedent, that merely held that in one specific case 
the Oakland Raiders could move to Los Angeles.  But when
he would come up to Capitol Hill, he'd say the Raiders’ case 
is a disaster and the NFL would fall apart unless they 
received an antitrust exemption. So I don’t place too much 
stock in what people say they're going to do if something
changes the status quo.  The better approach is to first ask 
what is economically rational. And if what they claim
they're going to do is economically irrational, then the next 
thing I want to ask is the psychology and organizational 
behavior people if there was there some reason that they're 
going to do something that isn't economically rational for 
some other motivation.  And if there is little these folks can 
suggest, then I think the most probable conclusion is that these 
officials are simply complaining. So I think we really have to 
look at it in that context.
Dr. Rodney Fort: I would chime in NO and NO. I mean the
first one is along these lines. The idea that if you just simply
weigh the economic rationale of it, there's no way in the 
whole wide world of sports that Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Michigan State, just walk down the line, are going to reduce
their competitiveness for students, if nothing else, by
dropping down to D3. It's as far fetched as I can imagine. 
And the second part is just the functional part of, you know, 
conferences don't kick members out. I would ask my 
learned folks in the audience who might be studying that 
history, but when was the last time someone was kicked out 
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of an F.B.S. football conference? 
Dr. Richard Southall: In fact it's the opposite they come up
with rules to try to find ways to keep people in.
Dr. Rodney Fort: Years ago I was at a different institution. 
And I asked that question about the bottom feeders of what
was then a Pac-10 Conference. Why don't you just kick 
them out and send them to the Big Sky, that's essentially the
level of sports they’re playing anyway and he just visibly 
paled and said we would never kick any member of the Pac-
Ten out of the Pac-Ten. There could be a decision process 
where they might leave. But kicking them out is simply not 
his job.
Dr. Richard Southall: I think this goes back to earlier
when you asked about if universities were to lock out the 
players. What do you think the top five spring sporting 
events are? What are they, what's number one? What are 
people looking forward to right around this time. Major 
league baseball spring training. What's number two? March 
Madness. Number three? NFL draft. If the universities 
locked out their players, the NFL in a heartbeat would say 
you open those damn doors. And you get us our players. So 
what you have to understand- I call it the Chicken Little
defense. Which I said to the senator from Maine when I was
testifying, and she did not laugh at all, and Ellen felt really
bad for me because it's one thing to bomb in a classroom. 
But in a Senate committee if you are being smart-alecky 
and she looked at me and went and I thought I better tell my 
daughter to move out of the state of Maine, which is where 
she was teaching at the time, and I said Crystal look for 
another job. 
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Dr. Ellen Staurowsky: You know there is an interesting thing 
about that comment- in terms of we need to become Division 3 
because in a way they’re insulting their members and their 
members said nothing. And to me, and their members in division 
three have really undervalued their own contributions from the 
standpoint of what they mean to this enterprise because if you pull 
Division 3 out of there you see it for the profit-seeking entity it is. 
Division 3 gives them education cover, gives them education 
credibility if there is any left it comes from Division 3. So it is very 
interesting that he actually does use that expression in my view, 
because it is very telling in terms of the hypocrisy of the whole 
thing. 
Dr. Richard Southall: NCAA Division-III is what I would call a 
“loss leader.” If you understand the concept of a loss leader, you 
can go to WalMart or any other big-box retail store, and there are 
certain items they sell below cost, with the expectation that you 
will purchase other more expensive products. So we need to have 
D-III athletes (the amateurs) who work just as hard as FBS football 
players (employees). Take a look at team photos from FBS athletic 
departments in all the sports other than football and men’s 
basketball and see whom those individuals are. The current system 
is akin to a regressive taxation system in which disproportionately 
Olympic sport and women’s sport athletes are upper middle / upper 
class and white. And we don’t want to talk about that because all 
of a sudden everyone is going “Oh no!”
Professor Stephen Ross: Let me just throw in one other point to 
answer your question. Prior to the 1984 antitrust decision in Board 
of Regents, the NCAA used to have one contract with CBS and one 
contract with ABC; viewers could watch about five games on 
Saturday and that was it. And now the Supreme Court said that 
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was illegal, there are over 30 games on television.  But it isn’t 
individualized competition, it is conference competition. The BIG 
10 has a contract, the PAC-12 has a contract, and the SEC has a 
contract. This could happen with student aid policies as well, if the 
NCAA got out of the business of setting rules and just left it up to 
the individual conferences. That might pass antitrust muster, given 
some of the challenges in the broadcast case. But that is not going 
to get you to the free market model where the most elite athletes 
are being paid their economic value. Because what I predict will 
happen is you’d have the BIG 10 will hire some antitrust lawyers 
because they know how to do this, and they will announce their 
policy and then the PAC 12 will follow their policy and then the 
SEC will announce their policy which will be a little more 
generous. Then the BIG 10 will decide, “Can we compete with 
those guys along those terms?” Well the SEC already is somewhat 
dominant, so the fact that the SEC does a little more, that’s ok and 
we will still have our own strategy. And if the SEC gets too out of 
line, the BIG 10 is not going to go to Division 3, they will work 
out a deal that they and the PAC-12 and the A.C.C will have 
something they call “the real college football playoff” and just 
leave the SEC out of it; SEC can play Alabama v. LSU for the 
national championship with players who are being paid. That 
might well satisfy antitrust muster. It is not going to remedy a 
world where you believe it is unjust for student athletes not to 
receive the economic value of their services because there will not 
be a lot of options for them. 
Paige Szymanski: Do you have any questions?
Audience Member: The structure of this panel is very, very 
different from the one this morning where the other panel was very 
clear issue with a clear question of are these people employed, are 
they employees- yes they are. And it was more or less that. There 
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are implications in that. But this panel, there seems to me that 
there’s a huge kind of philosophical variation in what sort of things 
you might want and what might be the outcome. What struck me, I 
don’t have any skin in this game, for example, I’m not from this 
country and I didn’t grow up with college sports. It doesn’t bother 
me either way. But it seems to me that you as Americans really 
care about this. This really, really matters to you. I come from a 
world, like the rest of the world, where the big sport is soccer. 
Where if you think about the way athletes train and develop in the 
soccer world well- basically the way it works is this. The coaches 
identify you at the age of eight or nine or maybe even six or seven 
there’s been instances of contracts signed at five years old and then 
basically you don’t bother studying in school. You go to high 
school, you have league where you have to go. You don’t study 
because you’re going to make it as a professional soccer player. 
But again, like college sports, 98% of you are going to fail. Then 
age sixteen or seventeen you’re dropped by your club and there 
you go, you have no qualifications, no education, and you’re 
probably going to fail at an interview. It always struck me that for 
all the faults of the college system, grant you that terrible things go 
on, but nonetheless some people come out with an education which 
will give them something. They may not finish the degree, but they 
got something. They went to some classes, they saw the books. So 
my question is, what do each of you think, what’s your ideal, what 
would it mean for the student athletes? What would their lives 
actually be like in the world you are describing? In a way that 
would you like to see?   
Professor Stephen Ross: I would be really interested hearing from 
those who are more critical than I am as to their philosophical 
foundation.  Prof. Amy McCormick articulated her philosophical 
view it is unjust not to pay people their full economic value. Even 
the union guy, Mr. Adam, said “I don’t necessarily agree with 
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that.” If you want to assert a certain right as a fundamental 
principle to your animating philosophy, then it seems to me that 
you have to look at all the implications of that animating 
philosophy. To me, it really is just a question of public policy, and 
some sort of utilitarianism, with some Rawlsian justice for the very 
bottom. And that is how you’d sort of solve this on a more reform 
way. But a lot of the critics I feel are so caught up in the rhetoric of 
attacking the NCAA, that on the positive side I’d really welcome 
the answer to the question.
Ellen Staurowsky: I think of it differently to your question in 
terms of the ideal situation. Last week, just over a week ago, 
Richard Nye along with Professors McCormick and McCormick, 
we announced the formation of a group called College Athlete 
Rights and Empowerment Faculty Coalition. And the motivating 
force behind that Coalition is to maybe answer your question in 
terms of what the future may hold from the standpoint that we see 
economic and academic mistreatment of the athletes in the profit 
sports of football and basketball, most of which are racial 
minorities. If we are looking at the sport of men’s basketball we’re 
looking at a racial composition of possibly as high as 70%. So we 
have all those factors. In terms of the reason, the definitional 
reason of why status is important to recognize this group as the 
labor force that it is, creates the portal through which treatment can 
then be examined.  At the present time, within the way statuses are 
constructed, college athletes are neither employees nor are they 
students. When they become an athlete on a college campus 
through the imposition of something called privilege, the 
participation in athletics is a privilege is not a right. They give up 
most of their rights as students. On the other hand since they are 
not recognized as employees, they occupy a space where they do 
not have access to basic, fundamental, civil and human rights to 
their own value, to who they are as people, to self-determination. 
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Within a higher education context they cannot necessarily speak 
out on their own behalf. They are barred by NCAA rules from 
having representation. Their coaches can negotiate multimillion 
dollar contracts thanks to agents. Athletes are barred from having 
that kind of representation. So this in my view, it is less about 
putting a specific number on how much a quarterback is worth 
than it is on their value as human beings. And this system denies 
them basic human rights. And this is something that should not be 
tolerated in higher education. Not in America. Not anywhere. But 
it is. When we talk about this, we talk about this in terms of the 
3%. Like some have the 3% don’t matter, and the 3% do matter. So 
for me, it would be rectifying that injustice and everything else will 
fall into line.
Dr. Rodney Fort: My response is that there were actually two. We 
heard Professor McCormick and then I heard Andy Zimbalist say 
let’s see if we can make it work inside the educational model. If
it’s going to be an educational activity, then let’s do that. And the 
analogy to me is the fine arts. So, if you think of the fine arts, here 
are performing people. They’re learning a skill that’s as physical as 
it is mental in many cases. And so the parallel for me, I know it 
may be speaking treason, is to have that conversation, step back a 
little bit, and actually take one of Walt Byer’s off-the-cuff remarks 
in his Un-Sportsman-Like Conduct and wonder about eliminating 
this tension that we as the academy actually have created, which is 
to force people who want to be athletes to be engineers. I think we 
worry too much about, well here’s a person who wanted to be an 
engineer but because of the demands on their time, they take 
another degree. And I’m not going to be as disparaging of those 
other degrees as others are off-the-cuff like sociology and business. 
There’s nothing wrong with sociology and business and there’s 
nothing wrong with general studies as a matter of fact. But, we sort 
of say they didn’t get their chance to do what they wanted. Well, 
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the vast majority of athletes are doing exactly what they want to 
do. The problem is we don’t recognize it as a legitimate activity 
academically.
Walt Byers said on page 327, I only know that because I jotted it 
down the other day, he says there should be a legitimate 
recognition of the pursuit of sport participation as an academic 
endeavor. And he talks about the fine arts as a comparison. If we 
step back and we think about what are we doing in higher 
education, we do a whole lot of things. Is there an educational 
mission in sports? Absolutely. Where do all of our coaches come 
from? Right? We force them to be sort of like high school teachers 
and they coach. All coaches played. So then all coaches were 
trained usually at institutions of higher ed. So there’s absolutely an 
educational activity going on. How to run a football practice. How 
to run a soccer match. All of these things we know now because its 
being done now and its being observed by the players who take it 
and do the next generation of it. It can be an educational activity. I 
gave you the B-school example earlier where it was viewed as not 
rigorous enough. Well fine, make it rigorous! That’s not hard to 
do. We’re good at that! Economists are better at it than most- let’s 
take simple things and make them real hard. For me then, the idea 
is to think broadly, well narrowly, but broadly in terms of Andy’s 
suggestion which is that we’re an educational institution, what do 
we do, how do we serve the athlete best? All of the human rights 
issues are absolutely important, but somehow we don’t worry 
about them for dance, those issues don’t arise.
Professor Stephen Ross: But if we’re not monetizing the dancer--
Dr. Rodney Fort: Oh, we certainly are monetizing the dancer.
Professor Stephen Ross: But we’re not.
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Dr. Rodney Fort: We have to buy tickets to go watch university 
fine arts activities. It’s just a matter of degree. The fact that people 
aren’t willing to pay as much doesn’t make it a non-monetized 
activity.
Dr. Richard Southall: I said that the Mark Twain quote earlier, 
“Nobody minds a war so long as it is not too big or in your own 
backyard.” What we have to fundamentally understand is 
employees can still go to school. Just because you have employee 
status and have basic human rights doesn’t mean that somehow 
you are foreclosed from going to college. I could negotiate as an 
employee that one of the benefits I get is a bonafide education that 
I control instead of giving them something. The amount of 
paternalism that is involved in college sport and in fantasizing 
college athletes is incredible. They are 18 years of age. They can 
serve in the military. They can die for us. But we somehow don’t 
think that they can negotiate a labor agreement. Figure it out.
Dr. Rodney Fort: In my opinion, it is a moot point. But you can 
go in the direction of legitimizing their activity on the university 
campus. 
Professor Stephen Ross: There are a number of reasons to be 
persuaded of the outcomes that my two panelists to my left have 
advocated. But I couldn’t disagree more with their methodological 
approach. To argue that this is an issue of fundamental human 
rights is to contradict the last panel, because the fundamental 
aspect of the National Labor Relations Act is the right of a 
majority of workers in a bargaining unit to bargain as an exclusive 
representative of the entire unit, and pay some members of the unit 
less than their economic value. A fundamental right means one that 
does not change, cannot change, the right to vote, freedom of 
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religion, etc.  Now there are a lot of libertarians who agree with a 
fundamental right to free market value for labor and services, and 
they would get rid of our labor laws. That is not what we are 
talking about now.  The use of oppositional rhetoric to the NCAA 
as if this some 60’s protest of “speaking truth to the Man,” maybe 
that works. But I hope law students at Michigan State University 
would be wary of advocating a policy position, where perhaps 
there are compromising and balanced interests, as a fundamental 
right.  And perhaps we do not true market value for everyone, 
perhaps we want something that gives athletes greater protection, 
some more money, but not completely. That is, I think, a much 
more advanced way to argue the debate than using the rhetoric of 
fundamental rights and individual rights and things of that nature. 
So I really fundamentally disagree with that rhetorical approach. 
Paige Szymanski: We have a couple minutes.
Dr. Richard Southall: I did not make a statement about these 
being legal rights. My background and training is philosophy and 
ethics. When I talk about a fundamental right, I’m talking about is 
it a deontological based right, a consequentialist based right, or an 
existential right.
Professor Stephen Ross: So what about the labor law? Is that a 
violation of philosophical rights in your judgment? The fact that 
there are current major league baseball players who are less than 6 
years of major league service who receive far less than their 
economic value to their club--
Dr. Richard Southall: The very basic ethical proposition is that it 
would be pragmatic. Which is fine. But you have to first look at 
the basic rights that an athlete should have to negotiate. To 
negotiate. Instead of simply putting the athlete in a subservient 
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position that he has no rights to access the labor law. That the 
athlete has no rights to challenge a system put in place. To deny 
both labor rights and basic fundamental human rights. So, basic 
human rights are not obtained through a legal mechanism. 
Immanuel Kant says that each one of us has a right to be treated as 
an end in him or herself, not as a means to an end. So I’m talking 
philosophical.
Professor Stephen Ross: So philosophically, the Wagner Act 
violates that Kantian right.
Dr. Richard Southall: It might. Which is fine. I’m not trained as a 
lawyer. My background and training is in ethics. So I’m going to 
question something based on that. I’ll leave the attorneys to tell me 
to be happy with what you get closest to what you want. As long as 
everyone is able to access that, I’ll probably be okay. Let the 
players have a good agent who can negotiate.
Paige Szymanksi: And we are just about out of time. [Audience 
Laughter]. We really are! It’s true. I’m not lying to you. I’d like all 
of us to thank the panelists one more time.   
Ashley Byers: For those of you wondering, it is 39-27 at the 
beginning of the second half, MSU is winning. My name is Ashley 
Byers and I am the current Editor in Chief of the Journal of 
Business and Securities Law. I just want to thank you all for 
attending today’s symposium and I would like to specifically 
recognize a few people. First, I’d like to again thank our wonderful 
panelists for being with us today. We are really appreciative and 
we’re very honored to be part of your dialogue. I’d also like to 
thank Professors Robert and Amy McCormick for all of the help 
and assistance they provided the journal with during the planning 
process for today. I’d also like to thank our advisor Professor 
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Elliott Spoon for his support throughout the year. I’d also like to 
thank the entre journal staff for all their work today as well as for 
the entire year. Also, I’d like to specially recognize the journal’s 
Executive Editor, Samantha, for all of the hard work she put into 
today’s event. So please join me in giving her a round of applause. 
As the newest member of Michigan State University College of 
Law’s journal community, the Journal of Business and Securities 
Law prides itself on publishing the best academic work relating to 
business law and securities law. The primary purpose of the
journal is to provide insight into the business community through 
legal analysis and other types of publications such as articles, 
personal narratives, and commentary. Today’s event is directly in 
line with the journal’s mission. We are thrilled to have worked 
with our panelists to present a symposium on a topic that affects 
the business life of the United States. Again, thank you very much 
to attending and we are looking forward to seeing you next year.
End note: A position statement has been prepared by some of the 
panelists that presented at this symposium. College Athletes Rights 
and Empowerment Faculty Coalition (CARE-FC) is a national 
coalition of faculty concerned with the academic and economic 
mistreatment of college athletes in the profit sports of football and 
basketball. The mission of CARE-FC is to support college athletes 
in their quest to fundamentally change the existing college sport 
industry by recognizing they are employees who deserve 
protections afforded such status. For more information, please visit 
http://care-fc.org/ and read the positions statements CARE-FC has 
prepared.80
                                                             
80 CARE-FC, CARE-FC Statement (Nov. 9, 2015) http://care-fc.org/care-fc-
statement/ 
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